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Chapter 1

Introduction

Workers’ compensation programs constitute the original example

of public “social insurance” in the United States, dating to the early
twentieth century. They also represent the first “no-fault” insurance
programs, as they replaced tort liability through the courts as a way
to cope with the growing incidence of injuries as America became
industrialized. These state government programs specify medical
and wage-loss benefits that must be provided by employers for their
workers who become disabled by work-related injury or disease.1
The state and provincial workers’ compensation programs for
injured workers in North America emanate from a historical compromise. Workers who had an employment-related injury gave up
their right to sue their employers under common law for negligence
in exchange for receiving prompt and certain medical, rehabilitation,
and wage-loss benefits. While the actual amount of compensation
would be significantly less than would be received from a successful tort liability suit, the certainty of receiving benefits that would be
adequate and equitable would be worth the trade-off.
Over the years, the programs have been subjected to intense partisan criticism, interpretation and reinterpretation by the courts, and
reforms and re-reforms as the political winds have blown back and
forth. Now, as workers’ compensation programs pass the century mark
since their original enactment, it is time for a reevaluation (Grabell
and Berkes 2015; USDOL 2016).
This volume represents an effort to draw policy implications from
research in three critical performance areas for workers’ compensation programs: 1) the adequacy of compensation for those disabled in
the workplace, 2) return-to-work performance for injured workers,
and 3) prevention of disabling injury and disease. We believe these
are, or should be, the three most important objectives for workers’
compensation systems. Thus, the three chapters that follow, dealing
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in turn with these three topics, provide our assessment of the performance of workers’ compensation systems after the first 100 years.
We explore best practices among the states and find hopeful signs of
progress in some states. Furthermore, we believe these best practices
could provide the outline of an agenda for true reform of workers’
compensation in the United States.
It is clear that additional research on workers’ compensation programs is needed—particularly research that uses similar methods and
types of data across different states to build a consensus of comparative results and policy insights. But research on workers’ compensation policy issues faces many hurdles. First, state workers’ compensation systems differ significantly from each other, in both substantial
and trivial ways. Sometimes these differences are obvious and make
direct comparisons impossible. Other differences are more subtle and
therefore easy for the researcher to miss, making comparisons misleading. This is particularly annoying to those state officials who are
expert in their own system and protective of its public image. In either
case, direct comparisons between systems are difficult, and potentially dangerous, in a contentious political environment.
In addition, research studies designed to answer specific policy
questions in different jurisdictions likely used different data and
methods and for those reasons may not be directly comparable. This
is demonstrated by the research on benefit adequacy in workers’ compensation that is reviewed here. As a result, research studies on workers’ compensation programs often are descriptive and focus on one or
a small number of jurisdictions to preserve their credibility.2 But of
course that undermines their effective application to other systems.
Because of these and other barriers, the burden of sponsoring
policy-relevant research falls pretty much on the workers’ compensation systems themselves. And to say that the administrators of these
systems are not always eager to consider a “research solution” to a
policy problem would be a considerable understatement. Given the
intensely political environment when dealing with relations between
labor and business—relations that also involve serious cost issues—
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keeping one’s head down is a good strategy for workers’ compensation administrators.
Nevertheless, the Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
has conducted, supported, and published research on workers’ compensation programs for nearly 40 years. We began with the specific
policy issue of inflation protection for injured workers in the Michigan workers’ compensation system in the late 1970s (Hunt 1981).
Over the years, our activities expanded to include many of the major
issues around preventing and compensating for disability at the state,
federal, and international levels.3
In this book, we review the status of state workers’ compensation
programs on the three critical performance dimensions mentioned
earlier (benefit adequacy, return-to-work performance, and prevention) at the programs’ centennial milepost, using the research record
that has been compiled to date. We do not offer a comprehensive
review of the literature but rather provide a more selective sampling
of research on these policy issues. We have based our conclusions
largely on our own research, on research the Upjohn Institute has published, and on other research familiar to us. Thus, this volume has a
more personal perspective than the typical research publication.
We sincerely hope that these analyses will prove useful for policymakers and policy researchers who are eager to carry the torch forward and see that much-needed improvements are made. It is vital
that we determine whether these century-old programs still have the
capacity to resolve the societal problems of occupational injury and
disease, or whether they need more than mere updating.
Notes
1. There are several good introductions to workers’ compensation available. See Baldwin and McLaren (2016).
2. But see the New Mexico study of comparative permanent partial disability (PPD) compensation adequacy for an outstanding counterexample in Reville et al. (2001).
3. See research.upjohn.org/workcomp_dis/ for all relevant Upjohn Institute publications since 1980.

Chapter 2

W

Benefit Adequacy and Equity

orkers’ compensation programs for workers disabled by their
work are the oldest social insurance programs in the United States
and Canada. Issues of benefit adequacy and equity have been central
to workers’ compensation systems from the start, at the beginning of
the twentieth century.
The simplest way to assess the adequacy and equity of benefits
is with reference to the statutory framework.1 What level of wage
replacement is specified by statute? The most common index among
U.S. states is 66.67 percent (two-thirds) gross wage replacement.2
This reflects the fact that such wage-replacement benefits are free
of any federal or state tax, as well as a desire by policymakers to
maintain work incentives by ensuring that there is a net benefit to
working. The fact that there are specific caps on maximum benefits
in all workers’ compensation states, and that minimum benefits are
provided in most, also clearly indicates that there has been some legislative judgment of the amount of wage replacement that is thought
to be appropriate.
Equity is also relatively simple to measure in concept. An equitable system is one in which all workers would be treated the same,
or those in similar circumstances would be treated in similar ways.
These policy concerns directly introduce an element of social welfare
into the evaluation of workers’ compensation benefits.
Beginning at least with Professor Arthur H. Reede in 1947
(whose seminal work, Adequacy of Workmen’s Compensation, is
cited in Somers and Somers [1954], p. 80), scholars of workers’ compensation have struggled to provide an accurate assessment of benefit adequacy. Obviously it is a prime point of contention between
the interests of injured workers and the employers who pay for their
workers’ compensation insurance. It is also a major influence on any
assessment of the sociopolitical performance of workers’ compensa-
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tion programs as a way of handling the consequences of industrial
injuries and illnesses.
This chapter will review the empirical evidence from existing
studies of benefit adequacy and equity in workers’ compensation programs in the United States and Canada. We concentrate on both findings and methods, since there is still disagreement about the “best”
way to measure benefit adequacy empirically. We pay particular
attention to a pair of recent Canadian studies that have not had much
exposure. These studies are notable for their thorough and original
exploration of the implications of methodology in such research. Our
expectation is that our paper will help to stimulate additional discussion and perhaps prompt new studies of benefit adequacy and equity
performance by these important social insurance programs.

PREVIOUS STUDIES
One method that researchers have employed to study benefit
adequacy has been to conduct interviews of injured workers. Johnson, Cullinan, and Curington (1979) studied benefit adequacy by
interviewing nearly 2,000 workers’ compensation beneficiaries with
severe permanent impairments in California, Florida, New York,
Washington, and Wisconsin. They examined both the extent to which
injured workers received workers’ compensation benefits and the
degree to which people receiving benefits were compensated for their
lost wages. They found that the average total wage loss during the five
to seven years after injury was $5,842 in 1975 dollars and that almost
three-fourths of the sample were still experiencing significant wage
loss (at least $500 per annum) at the time of the survey. Approximately 10 percent of the sample never returned to work after their
injuries, and these individuals had a 22 percent wage replacement
rate for the entire period. Among those still receiving workers’ compensation benefits at the time of the survey, only an average of 12
percent of the wage loss was being replaced five years after the injury.
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Johnson, Cullinan, and Curington called the replacement rate “clearly
inadequate” (p. 97).
The California Workers’ Compensation Institute commissioned
another interview study of benefit adequacy in California in the early
1980s. As part of the study, an independent research firm interviewed
1,076 people with workers’ compensation claims from 1975 and 1976
six to seven years after the injury. The study found that the California workers’ compensation system on average replaced 49 percent of
lost earnings, and that people with the lowest disability ratings (1–9
percent) had the highest replacement rate—over 80 percent. However, the study also found that for the most serious (permanent and
total disability) claims, the replacement rate was 67 percent, as specified by statute. Nevertheless, the study concluded that the California
workers’ compensation system provided benefits that were both inadequate and inequitable (CWCI [1984], cited in Hunt [2004], p. 105).
More recent benefit adequacy studies generally use workers’
compensation administrative data on injured workers, combined with
wage records from a sample of comparison workers who were not
injured, in an attempt to estimate what workers would have earned
in the absence of the injury. They then calculate the loss replacement
rate as the extent to which workers’ compensation replaces compensation that they would have earned in the absence of the injury.
  WC income benefits
Loss replacement rate = ____________________________________
                Comparison earnings – postinjury earnings

Berkowitz and Burton (1987) implemented the first modern wage
loss study of state workers’ compensation programs. In addition to
describing the provisions of the varied programs for compensating
permanently disabling injuries in 10 states, they also analyzed wage
replacement performance in three states (Wisconsin, California, and
Florida) in a project funded by the National Science Foundation and
ultimately published by the Upjohn Institute. The findings were particularly stimulating because of the variety of disability evaluation
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strategies employed in these states. At the time of the observed injuries in 1968, Wisconsin used an impairment-level standard, California
used a loss-of-earning-capacity standard, and Florida offered injured
workers their choice between the two standards (Berkowitz and Burton 1987, Chapter 10). If a judgment could be made about benefit
adequacy under different disability evaluation methods, this would be
valuable information for policymakers.
For a sample of workers’ compensation injuries in 1968 from
each of the three states, Berkowitz and Burton (1987) secured two
years of preinjury wage data and five to six years (1968–1973) of
postinjury earnings data from the Social Security Administration, as
well as the actual workers’ compensation indemnity benefits paid to
the injured workers in California, Florida, and Wisconsin. Their comparison group to estimate wage loss consisted of California workers
who were also injured in 1968 but whose injuries received less than a
5 percent permanent disability rating. They also calculated “expected
growth ratios” for future wages by age, gender, and earnings level of
the California sample and applied these ratios to similar workers in
other states.
Berkowitz and Burton (1987) found that the overall wage
replacement rates were 46 percent for California, 59 percent for
Florida, and 75 percent for Wisconsin (p. 357). But the replacement
rates varied widely between contested and uncontested cases.3 For
contested cases, the replacement rates were relatively similar to the
overall replacement rates for California (41 percent) and Florida (51
percent), which had high rates of disputes (90 percent and 70 percent
contested claims, respectively). However, contested claims in Wisconsin were much less common (only 14 percent) and received lower
wage replacement compensation at 58 percent.
For uncontested cases, however, the replacement rates were
much higher for California and Florida. In California, Berkowitz and
Burton (1987) found that injured workers generally had no losses in
uncontested cases, meaning the replacement rate was infinite. In Wisconsin, the replacement rate was 85 percent for uncontested cases. In
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Florida, they found that workers’ compensation replaced 724 percent
of earnings losses, on average. These results were troubling.
In addition to the high degree of variability in the replacement
rate based on the litigation status of the case, Berkowitz and Burton (1987) found a high degree of variability in the replacement rate
based on the age of the worker and the body part injured. These findings indicate that the workers’ compensation programs in these states
faced serious equity issues as well as adequacy issues.
Boden and Galizzi (1999) estimated wages lost from work-related
injuries in Wisconsin by comparing injured workers who missed more
than one week of work in 1989–1990 to workers with less severe
injuries who missed less than one week of work. They found that the
Wisconsin workers’ compensation system replaced 64 percent of pretax lost wages for men and 50 percent of pretax lost wages for women
with temporary total disability (TTD) and permanent partial disability
(PPD) claims in the four to five years after the injury. But the replacement rates varied greatly by the amount of time missed from work.
Workers’ compensation in Wisconsin provided a replacement rate of
over 80 percent for TTD claims lasting less than six weeks but a much
lower replacement rate for TTD claims of longer duration. This was
because people with longer-duration TTD claims experienced wage
losses even after they no longer received workers’ compensation benefits. Boden and Galizzi found that PPD benefits replaced 83 percent
of lost income for men and 63 percent of lost income for women. So,
again, there seem to be equity issues arising from the different rates of
wage loss replacement for workers in different situations.
Peterson et al. (1998) and Reville (1999) studied replacement
rates for PPD claimants in California by matching workers injured
in 1993–1994 to uninjured workers employed at the same firm and
with similar preinjury wages. They found that injured workers earned
40 percent less pretax than noninjured workers during the five years
following the accident and that workers’ compensation replaced 38
percent of this loss. Reville also considered earnings loss and replacement rates by disability ratings. He found that injured workers with
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higher disability ratings experienced both higher earnings losses and
higher replacement rates of those earnings losses than those with less
serious injuries.
Biddle (1998) estimated lost wages for seriously injured workers
in the state of Washington by comparing workers injured in 1993–
1994 who received indemnity (wage loss) payments in the 3.5 years
after an injury to those who had medical-only claims. He first showed
that seriously injured workers who experienced time loss of 15 or
more days experienced lost wages immediately in the quarter of their
injury. After 3.5 years, the difference between the seriously injured
workers and the control group of medical-only claims had shrunk
but had not gone away completely. Biddle found that the Washington
workers’ compensation system replaced an average of 40 percent of
after-tax lost wages for workers with time-loss claims over the 3.5
years after injury.
Unlike what Boden and Galizzi (1999) found in Wisconsin,
injured workers in Washington who missed more time had higher
replacement rates than those who missed less time. For workers with
permanent disabilities, the after-tax replacement rates were over 100
percent. A possible explanation for this may be that Biddle (1998)
had only 3.5 years of data after the injury. The most severely injured
workers may have experienced losses for years after their benefits
ceased, while PPD benefits are given in a lump sum after the injury in
Washington. When Biddle projected 10-year replacement rates based
upon presumptions about future earnings and workers’ compensation
benefits, the average PPD replacement rate shrank to 34 percent.
Biddle (1998) also investigated the distribution of wage losses
across workers and how wage losses differed based on demographic
characteristics and injury types. He found that a small number of
workers experienced very significant wage loss. Of workers missing
15–60 days of work during the observation period, 10 percent were
still experiencing large earnings losses one year after the injury. He
found that workers under 26 years of age experienced higher earnings losses compared to older workers with similar preinjury wages.
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Head injuries led to greater wage losses than injuries to other parts
of the body, and married women experienced greater earnings losses
than both married men and unmarried men. Injured workers experienced similar losses regardless of whether they were employed at
self-insured firms or insured firms.
In the most ambitious effort to date, Reville et al. (2001) evaluated the benefit adequacy of workers’ compensation for PPD claimants in New Mexico by comparing replacement rates for PPD
claimants in New Mexico in 1994–1998 to PPD claimants in California, Wisconsin, Washington, and Oregon over the same period. To
calculate replacement rates, they examined the degree to which workers’ compensation benefits offset the earnings differences between
workers with partially disabling occupational injuries and similar
workers without injuries during the five years after the first group
suffered injury. New Mexico PPD claimants lost 23 percent of their
earnings on average during the first five years after the injury and 20.5
percent of their wages during the first 10 years after the injury.
During the first five years after the injury, the pretax replacement
rate in New Mexico was 65 percent, nearly identical to the two-thirds
statutory standard. During the 10 years after the injury, the pretax
replacement rate fell to 46 percent, as benefits fell off more rapidly
than did wage losses. Ten-year pretax loss-replacement rates were
37 percent, 42 percent, 41 percent, and 29 percent in California,
Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin, respectively (Table 2.1). Thus,
New Mexico had the highest replacement rates of any of the states.
However, after accounting for differences in industry composition
between the states, New Mexico had a replacement rate that was in
the middle of the states. Reville et al. (2001) found that claimants in
the top 20 percent of the income distribution in New Mexico had the
lowest earnings replacement, while replacement rates were relatively
equitable for the rest of the income distribution.
This was the “state of the science” when the National Academy of
Social Insurance and the Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
published Adequacy of Earnings Replacement in Workers’ Compen-
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Table 2.1  Ten-Year Earnings Losses and Replacement Rates for
PPD Claimants
NM
WA
CA
WI
OR
Potential earnings ($)
167,244 250,251 238,262 222,055 197,737
10-year losses ($)
34,314 41,220 61,767 49,477 39,202
Total benefits ($)
15,832 16,734 22,612 14,452 16,636
Proportional wage
20
16
25
23
20
loss (%)a
Pretax wage loss
46
41
37
29
42
replacement rate (%)b
Row 2 / Row 1.
Row 3 / Row 2.
SOURCE: Adapted from Reville, Bhattacharya, and Weinstein (2001).

a

b

sation Programs (Hunt 2004). A Study Panel on Benefit Adequacy
of the National Academy spent several years reviewing conceptual
issues and evaluating the empirical work that had been done to that
time. The study panel endorsed the wage-loss studies as “the best
yardstick to measure the adequacy of benefits” (p. 132). However,
“for all categories involving substantial lost time from work or permanent disabilities, aggregate replacement rates are considerably below
the two-thirds standard when considered over the 10-year period following the injury” (p. 132).
In addition, the study panel called for additional wage loss studies from other states, especially studies that included TTD claims and
studies from states using alternative methods for setting PPD benefits.
The hope was that additional studies would provide more guidance
to policymakers seeking the most adequate, equitable, and efficient
wage replacement policy.
However, we are aware of only three other U.S. studies since
the release of the study panel report and recommendations in 2004.
Seabury et al. (2014) studied New Mexico workers’ compensation
claims with injury dates from 1994 to 2000. This study linked back to
the early Berkowitz and Burton study by utilizing federal data from
the Internal Revenue Service and Social Security Administration
rather than state unemployment insurance data to determine earnings.
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Seabury et al. were able to secure actual earnings data for up to 10
years following the injury. But findings were disappointing, as they
estimated that only 16 percent of losses were replaced by workers’
compensation benefits.
Dworsky et al. (2016) used the same methods as Reville, Bhattacharya, and Weinstein (2001) to study trends in earnings losses and
workers’ compensation benefits paid before, during, and after the
“Great Recession” in California. This study, funded by the California Commission on Health and Safety and Workers’ Compensation,
probes the impacts of the recession during a period that also saw considerable policy changes in benefits for permanently disabled California workers. They found that workers injured during and after the
Great Recession of 2008–2009 experienced substantially higher earnings losses than those injured earlier. Impairment ratings and workers’
compensation benefits both increased, but the loss replacement rate
still decreased because of a shift toward lower wage levels for workers injured during the recession.
The third study was supported by the Workers Compensation
Research Institute and is reported in some detail below (Savych and
Hunt 2016). Covering Michigan workers injured in 2004 and earnings records through 2008, this study raises questions about the most
appropriate measure of earnings losses for workers’ compensation
policy purposes.

MORE RECENT CANADIAN STUDIES
Tompa, Scott-Marshall, et al. (2010), from the Institute for Work
and Health in Toronto, have contributed a more recent Canadian perspective to this body of work. In a path-setting but little-known study
for the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board (WSIB) in Ontario,
they compared the benefit adequacy of three Canadian compensation
regimes: 1) the permanent-impairment regime in place in Ontario
before the 1990 reforms, 2) the loss-of-earnings-capacity regime
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installed in Ontario by the 1990 reforms, and 3) the bifurcated regime
(claimant gets the higher of impairment or loss-of-earnings-capacity
benefit) in British Columbia before 2002.
Table 2.2 shows the details of compensation regimes for the three
Canadian workers’ compensation programs studied by Tompa, ScottMarshall, et al. (2010). Ontario based compensation on after-tax (or
spendable) earnings, with a 90 percent nominal replacement rate.
British Columbia used the more traditional 75 percent of preinjury
gross (i.e., before-tax) earnings.
Tompa, Scott-Marshall, et al. (2010) also provide a painstaking
analysis of the different methodologies for measuring the earnings
losses of injured workers. For instance, they explain and illustrate
the differences between the “loss replacement rate” and the “earnings replacement rate.” The loss replacement rate uses the difference
between comparison group earnings and injured worker earnings as
the denominator, with workers’ compensation benefits paid as the
numerator to calculate the rate.
  WC income benefits
Loss replacement rate = ____________________________________
                Comparison earnings – postinjury earnings

The earnings replacement rate adds the postinjury earnings of
injured workers to the numerator, thereby taking into account the
residual earning capacity of injured workers. It then compares this
total to the estimated earnings in the absence of injury (comparison
earnings). The result is a higher measured replacement rate, which is
due to the mathematics, but which also more accurately reflects the
fact that most injured workers will return to work and their earnings
losses will be temporary. Thus, the earnings replacement rate takes
the perspective of the injured worker and his/her income flow rather
than the perspective of the workers’ compensation system.
     WC income benefits + postinjury earnings
Earnings replacement rate = __________________________________
		
Comparison earnings

Table 2.2 Summary of Three Long-Term Disability Compensation Programs
Program
Permanent impairment
(Ontario, pre-1990)

Short-term
disability
benefit amounta
90% of preaccident,
after-tax earnings

Criteria
Long-term
for long-term
disability benefit
disability benefitb
amounta
Permanent impairment 90% × preaccident,
after MMI
after-tax earnings ×
percentage permanent
impairment
90% × after-tax loss
of earnings capacity

Loss of earnings capacity 90% of preaccident,
(Ontario, post-1990)
after-tax earnings

12 continuous
months on short-term
disability benefits

Bifurcated (British
Columbia, pre-2002)

Permanent impairment Higher of:
after MMI
1) 75% × preaccident,
before-tax earnings
× percentage permanent impairment; OR

75% of preaccident,
before-tax earnings

Time period
for long-term
disability benefits
Benefits paid
for life

Separate loss
of quality of
life award paid
No

Benefits received until
age 65, followed by
pension based on 10%
of benefits received

Yes

Benefits paid for life

No

2) 75% × before-tax
loss of earnings
capacity
Subject to maximum compensable earnings limit.
“MMI” refers to maximum medical improvement, the conventional time for assessing the level of remaining permanent disability.
SOURCE: Tompa, Scott-Marshall, et al. (2010), Table 1.

a

b
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Figure 2.1 shows the aggregate after-tax loss replacement rates
for the Canadian systems analyzed by Tompa, Scott-Marshall, et al.
(2010). These workers’ compensation systems replace an average of
60–140 percent of lost earnings, with the bifurcated system yielding
considerably higher numbers than the other two (which are quite similar). This should not be surprising: since the bifurcated system gives
the higher of the two benefits under the other regimes, it is nearly certain to yield a higher average number than either of the others alone,
unless one of them is consistently higher than the other.
Overall, it appears that these Canadian systems replace an average of at least 75–80 percent of after-tax lost wages, except for the
low (1–5 percent) impairment group. There also appears to be a tendency for loss replacement rates to increase with severity of impairment in all three systems. The exception is for those with greater than
50 percent impairment in the bifurcated system.
Figure 2.1 Aggregate Loss Replacement Rates
160

Impairment

LOE capacity

Bifurcated

140

% loss replacement

120
100
80
60
40
20
0

1–5

6–10

11–20
21–50
Impairment level (%)

> 50

SOURCE: Developed by the authors from Tompa, Scott-Marshall, et al. (2010).
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Figure 2.2 compares the postinjury earnings plus workers’ compensation benefits paid for each injured worker to the earnings of the
uninjured comparison group. It uses this aggregate-level earnings
replacement rate as the measure of benefit adequacy. Therefore, benefit adequacy is expressed as the percentage of after-tax lost earnings
that are replaced by workers’ compensation benefit payments plus
workers’ estimated earnings for the 10 years following the injury.
Figure 2.2 shows this estimate for the range of impairment levels,
from the minor to the very serious. This makes it possible to judge the
equity of the benefits paid by the workers’ compensation system. It
would be desirable for all injured workers to receive the same replacement level of their lost earnings, subject to the impact of benefit caps,
which would tend to reduce the replacement rates for higher-earning
workers. The Ontario impairment scheme comes very close to achieving that objective, with consistent earnings replacement rates until the
Figure 2.2  Aggregate Earnings Replacement Rates
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50 percent impairment level. British Columbia shows more variation
by impairment level.
These benefit adequacy rates cannot be precisely compared with
the earlier studies in the United States because of the differences in
methodology. However, since Tompa, Scott-Marshall, et al. (2010)
did report the aggregate-level loss replacement rates for these three
workers’ compensation regimes, this facilitates rough comparisons with the U.S. studies cited earlier. Table 2.3 shows that for the
Ontario pre-1990 impairment rating system, the after-tax aggregate
loss replacement rate was 76 percent. For the post-1990 Ontario
loss-of-earnings-capacity rating system, the aggregate loss replacement rate was 80 percent; for the British Columbia bifurcated system, the aggregate loss replacement rate was 95 percent. Clearly, all
three of these regimes were more generous in replacing lost earnings for injured workers than any of the U.S. states studied to date.
Furthermore, all but the 1–5 percent impairment group in British
Columbia achieved more than 100 percent aggregate-level after-tax
loss replacement rates. Concern about this apparent overcompensation was a major motivating factor in the elimination of the British
Columbia bifurcated system of compensation in 2002.
In another commissioned study, Tompa, Mustard, et al. (2010)
evaluated the impact of the major revisions to the workers’ compensation benefits in British Columbia that took effect in June 2002
(Bill 49). These changes included altering the compensation benefit
formula from 75 percent of preaccident, before-tax gross earnings to
90 percent of after-tax net earnings. It also involved moving from
the “bifurcated” system of compensating permanent disabilities
described earlier to a dominant focus on loss of functional capacity, and a restriction of the cost-of-living adjustment to annual (rather
than semiannual) adjustment at 1 percent less than the change in the
consumer price index (CPI), with a cap of 4 percent annually (rather
than just CPI without a cap).4
The research team specifically was asked “to assess the adequacy
and equity of benefits provided to claimants under the pre–Bill 49

Table 2.3 Replacement Rates by Impairment Stratum for Losses in Three Canadian Workers’ Compensation Programs
Loss
Earnings
Strata
Proportion
replacement
replacement
Program
(% impairment)
Sample size
w/ loss (%)
rate (%)
rate (%)
Permanent-impairment
1–5
3,235
71
63
92
program sample
6–10
3,415
83
75
91
11–20
3,630
88
77
88
21–50
1,270
93
83
89
> 50
145
97
95
96
Entire sample
11,700
83
76
90
1–5
3,005
71
80
91
Loss-of-earningscapacity program
6–10
2,750
77
77
93
sample
11–20
4,225
83
82
92
21–50
2,755
91
86
92
> 50
150
97
100
100
Entire sample
12,885
81
80
92
Bifurcated program
1–5
1,670
70
78
95
sample
6–10
515
79
101
100
11–20
290
86
111
105
21–50
125
88
139
119
> 50
45
89
126
119
Entire sample
2,645
75
95
99
19

SOURCE: Tompa, Scott-Marshall, et al. (2010), Table 5.
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policy and to assess the impact of Bill 49 changes on benefits for
claimants” (Tompa, Mustard, et al. 2010, p. 4). The researchers followed the actual earnings of injured workers for 10 years if their
injury was permanent and six years if temporary. They evaluated the
impact of these benefit changes by gender, age, geographic location,
and severity of functional impairment. They used several alternative
analytical methods, as in the Ontario study. They also used actual
preinjury earnings to estimate the wage loss for the uninjured state
instead of a comparison worker method. Again, all empirical results
were reported so that readers could select the measure they found
most compelling.
Overall, Bill 49 was estimated to have reduced workers’ compensation benefits in British Columbia by 15 percent. Lesser functional
impairment categories had higher earnings recovery, males did better
than females, and geography did not appear to matter significantly.
The long-term disability sample showed an average estimated aggregate-level after-tax earnings replacement rate of 96 percent. However,
for the 50-to-59-year-old group of injured workers, the 90 percent
target replacement rate was not reached, either before or after Bill 49.
Average aggregate earnings replacement for the 50–59 age group was
78 percent.
The short-term disability sample suffered an estimated average
reduction of 9 percent in earnings over six years, but most demographic strata still did achieve 90 percent earnings replacement.
Again, the exception was the 50–59-year-old group, which had an
aggregate earnings replacement rate of 88 percent.

WORKERS COMPENSATION RESEARCH INSTITUTE
STUDY IN MICHIGAN
The Workers Compensation Research Institute (WCRI) and the
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research recently collaborated on a
study of the workers’ compensation system in Michigan (Savych and
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Hunt 2017). The adequacy of workers’ compensation benefits, their
equity, and their efficacy in promoting return to work were assessed
based on a 2004 sample of over 77,000 injured workers evaluated at
the end of 2008 (an average of 4.5 years after injury date).
A total of 8,781 Michigan indemnity claims from 2004 with at
least one month of lost work time and some wage loss compensation paid were available from the Detailed Benchmark/Evaluation
database maintained by WCRI. These claims were matched using
propensity-score reweighting procedures against a sample of 63,887
medical-only claims from 2004, which provided the comparison
group for estimating what postinjury earnings would have been for
the injured workers if they had not been injured.5 Quarterly earnings
for these claimants from 2003–2008 were obtained from the Michigan Department of Energy, Labor, and Economic Growth. Earnings
are observed from 4 to 7 quarters before the injury date and from 16 to
19 quarters following the injury date, depending upon the actual quarter of the injury in 2004. Thus, postinjury earnings and compensation
are observed for an average of 4.5 years, ranging from 4 to 5 years,
depending upon the specific date of the injury.
Figure 2.3 shows the average earnings for injured workers who
receive workers’ compensation indemnity payments for at least one
month and those who have medical-only injuries. Note that earnings
of the comparison group peak in Quarter 0, which is the quarter of
the injury. This reflects the requirement that all injured workers must
have been working in Quarter 0 or they would not have been covered.
Earnings of injured workers peak one quarter before the injury (since
no work time is lost in that quarter), decline rapidly in the quarter of
injury and the following quarter, and then begin to recover, but not to
the level of the comparison group of medical-only injuries. It is the
gap between these two earnings lines that represents the wage losses
that the workers’ compensation system is designed to replace.6
For the sample, the average after-tax loss of earnings following
the injury is about $1,000 per quarter. And, as in other wage-loss studies in the United States and Canada, those losses appear to be very
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Figure 2.3  Unadjusted Average Quarterly Earnings of Michigan
Workers Injured in 2004, by Quarter from Injury and
Injury Type
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NOTE: Quarterly earnings information covers the period between 2003 and 2008.
Sample includes workers injured in Michigan in 2004. Indemnity injury sample
includes workers who had more than one month of lost time or received lump-sum
payments. Medical-only injury sample includes workers with medical-only injuries.
SOURCE: Savych and Hunt (2017).

persistent or even permanent (at least, there is no indication of significant improvement after five years). Because only quarterly earnings
data are available, we cannot tell whether the losses are the result of
reduced labor force participation, reduced hours of work, or hourly
wage reductions.
Because Michigan is a wage-loss state, there is no independent
assessment of the degree of permanent impairment for injured workers. All one can do is compare the amount of compensation received
from the workers’ compensation system to the lost earnings. As a
proxy for severity of injury, the number of weeks of wage-loss compensation that are paid to the injured worker is used. An injury that
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requires more weeks away from work is probably more serious, but
there may be other things that influence the duration of disability payments, so this is not the equivalent of an estimate of residual disability
that would be available from an impairment system.
Table 2.4 shows the after-tax earnings replacement rates and loss
replacement rates for all injured workers with more than one month
of temporary total disability or a lump sum and for subgroups by
disability duration. Both the earnings replacement rate for the average observed duration of 4.5 years and the projection of the earnings
replacement rate out to 10 years are shown for each group. For the
10-year projections, claim-specific reserves were added to payments
already made to estimate the total workers’ compensation payments,
while wage losses were projected to continue at the level observed at
the end of 2008. For all injured workers with more than one month of
lost time, the after-tax earnings replacement rate after 4.5 years is 97
percent, and after 10 years we estimate that it is 88 percent. Subgroup
earnings replacement rates at 4.5 years vary from 94 to 96 percent for
those with temporary disability compensation only, and from 91 to 95
percent at 10 years.
This is a good deal higher than earlier U.S. studies found, but
roughly comparable to the Canadian results. This primarily reflects
the addition of postinjury earnings to workers’ compensation payments when calculating the losses associated with the injuries. These
earnings were not included in the same manner with workers’ compensation payments in the U.S. studies, but they were in the Canadian
studies cited. Also, most U.S. studies only included injured workers with permanent partial disabilities, whereas the Michigan study
included all injured workers with more than one month of lost work
time. It is widely understood that compensation for permanent partial injuries tends to be lower than for temporary injuries in workers’
compensation programs. This reflects the disputed elements involved
in such injury claims.
Presumably, workers with what are called permanent partial
injuries in other states would end up receiving redemption payments

NOTE: Claims assessed at between 4 and 5 years after injury. This projects to 10 years based on current earnings and workers’ compensation
payments at time of assessment plus claim reserves.
SOURCE: Savych and Hunt (2017), Technical Appendix Tables C4a and C4b.
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Table 2.4  Earnings Replacement and Loss Replacement Rates for Workers with Indemnity Injuries in Michigan in 2004
Earnings replacement rate (%)
Loss replacement rate (%)
Indemnity groups based on duration of temporary disability
payments and receipt of lump-sum settlement
at 4.5 years
at 10 years
at 4.5 years
at 10 years
97
88
87
52
All injured workers with lump sum or > 1 month temporary
disability
Subgroups of temporary disability duration (no lump sum)
1–3 months
96
95
40
23
4–6 months
94
91
51
31
7–12 months
96
95
77
59
> 12 months
94
95
89
91
Subgroups with lump-sum settlements
Lump sum and no TD payments
30
74
57
57
Lump sum and 1–3 months TD
35
85
62
71
Lump sum and 4–12 months TD
49
98
67
97
Lump sum and > 12 months TD
91
155
92
170
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(“lump sum” payments) in Michigan, so it is relevant to examine this
group in more detail. For all claims receiving lump-sum payments,
the average after-tax earnings replacement rate is 101 percent at 4.5
years (reflecting the impact of the lump-sum payment some time during the first 4.5 years). This falls to 69 percent when projected out to
10 years since the lump-sum payment will close the claim for good
and there will be no remaining claim reserves.
The distribution of results for lump-sum claims when including their temporary disability payments indicates that, on average,
those receiving some TTD were more adequately compensated. This
probably reflects the high level of controversion among lump-sum
claims. Those showing no temporary disability payments likely had
their claims disputed from the start and therefore ended up with lower
compensation overall.
Table 2.4 also reports the loss replacement rates for Michigan
workers. As discussed earlier, this is the typical measure of benefit
adequacy that has been used in most previous studies. Except for the
omission of workers with injuries that received less than one month of
TTD, and the fact that all such indemnity claims—not just permanent
partial disability claims—were included, these after-tax loss replacement rates should be more comparable with those of other U.S. studies than the earnings replacement rates used in this study.
With one exception, all the loss replacement rates are lower than
the earnings replacement rates. The one exception is for claims with
more than 12 months of TTD followed by a lump-sum settlement.
Presumably, these injured workers at 4.5 years after the injury have
recent lump-sum settlements. Note that the projected replacement
rates for this group at 10 years are nearly identical for both measures.
It is interesting that the difference between the earnings replacement rate and the loss replacement rate is greatest for the shortest-duration claims. This sustains our belief that it is the “overweighting” of
short-term claims that drags the aggregate loss replacement rate down.
Figure 2.4 shows the net effect of the workers’ compensation
benefits paid to injured workers in Michigan. The total income from
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Figure 2.4  Average Quarterly Earnings, Workers’ Compensation Income
Replacement Benefits, and Reweighted Comparison Earnings,
by Quarter from Injury, Injuries in Michigan in 2004
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NOTE: Sample includes workers injured in Michigan in 2004. Indemnity injury sample
includes workers who had more than one month of lost time or received lump-sum
payments. Comparison-sample quarterly earnings information covers period between
2003 and 2008.
SOURCE: Savych and Hunt (2017).

earnings and income replacement benefits (solid line) falls for two
quarters and then begins to rise, and it actually exceeds that of the
comparison workers (light dashed line) between 1.5 years and 2.5
years after the injury (Quarters 6 through 10) as lump sums are paid
out. However, the total income of the injured workers falls rapidly
after these payments are mostly completed, and the shortfall with
comparison workers grows significantly after 2.5 years (Quarter
10). It seems clear that the total income from earnings and benefits
is headed for convergence with the line for earnings alone five years
after the injury, as the vast majority of workers’ compensation benefits will have been paid out.
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CONCLUSION
It is 30 years since the initial wage-loss study by Berkowitz and
Burton (1987) was published, but we continue to struggle toward a
better understanding of the adequacy and equity of workers’ compensation benefits. While we have wage loss benefit adequacy studies from the states of California, Michigan, New Mexico, Oregon,
Washington, and Wisconsin, plus the provinces of British Columbia
and Ontario in Canada, it is still difficult to make summary judgments
or accurate comparisons across the jurisdictions. There are several
reasons for this. First, the workers’ compensation systems themselves
differ substantially, both in design and in actual application. This has
plagued research on workers’ compensation systems and limited the
generalizability of any findings.
Second, there are small but significant differences in methodology between the studies, which lead to differences in the findings.
These differences reflect the specific data available to the researchers,
as well as honest differences of opinion about how best to measure
benefit adequacy in these complicated social insurance systems.
Third, there are inevitable differences in interpretation of the
findings that are derived from these studies. Some of these differences unfortunately will be interpreted as political leanings in this age
of political polarization. It would be difficult to expect a social insurance system like workers’ compensation to be exempt from political
influences or interpretations.
Upon completion of the multiyear Study Panel on Benefit Adequacy at the National Academy of Social Insurance more than a
decade ago, the members of the panel called for “additional wage loss
studies from different jurisdictions” (Hunt 2004, p. 133). These studies have not been forthcoming. As we have seen, in the past decade
there have only been the two Canadian studies, one study in New
Mexico, another in California, and the recent study from Michigan.
The analytical techniques have certainly been developed and refined,
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but there has been little progress in our understanding of what works
better in a workers’ compensation system and why. It appears to us at
this time that there is insufficient interest in the answer to the question, “Are workers’ compensation benefits adequate and equitable?”
It is possible that recent discussions, prompted by a series of articles
published in ProPublica (e.g., Grabell and Berkes 2015a,b), may raise
the interest sufficiently to start a movement in this direction.
Our review indicates that the Michigan wage-loss workers’ compensation system seems to provide better benefit adequacy than other
U.S. systems that use the impairment method of compensation. But
Michigan’s is not as good as some Canadian systems for injured
workers. Unfortunately, we cannot discern whether this is due to
the wage-loss principle upon which the Michigan system is based or
some other factor. Theoretically, one would expect a benefit system
based on actual wage loss experienced, rather than a medical diagnosis of impairment or an estimate of loss of wage-earning capacity,
to yield more accurate earnings replacement results at the individual
level. And this does seem to be the case.
The Michigan system appears to be performing as designed, and
it also demonstrates increasing replacement rates for more serious
injuries, which may represent an element of social welfare thinking.
Workers who are more seriously injured, but not seriously enough to
qualify for Federal SSDI benefits, may have fewer income maintenance options and may not be able to respond to a financial incentive
that promotes return to work.
Short-duration workers’ compensation claims show the impact
of the waiting period (effectively a copay for injured workers), which
suppresses replacement rates for such claims. But such claims also
achieve very high return-to-work rates and quickly achieve near parity of earnings with those who did not lose any work time (medicalonly claims).
The findings from the Michigan study indicate that taking account
of the postinjury earnings of injured workers makes a significant difference in judgments about benefit adequacy. That is, earnings replace-
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ment rates are significantly “more adequate” than loss replacement
rates for the Michigan system as well as some Canadian provinces.
Furthermore, we believe that this is a preferable way to analyze
benefit adequacy, particularly for temporary disabilities, since the
societal goal is to return the injured worker to productive employment
with minimal disruption. Using earnings replacement rates rather
than loss replacement rates reflects this policy focus. It also highlights
the distinction between injured workers who need temporary support
while they recover from their injuries and those who will likely not
recover and need permanent support.
It is difficult to explain what seems to be a permanent drop in
earnings among injured workers who file workers’ compensation
claims. This has been found in all the wage loss studies to date and
confirmed in the WCRI interview studies of worker outcomes (Savych
and Thumula 2016). Apparently, injured workers suffer some kind of
“separation effect” similar to that of economically displaced workers.
This could be due to supply factors such as changed preferences for
income and work, or to demand factors such as discrimination by
employers against workers’ compensation claimants. This is a subject
that clearly deserves more investigation.
Concerns remain about the adequacy of lump-sum redemption
payments in Michigan to sustain injured workers over the remainder of their lives, but our analysis shows better outcomes than those
previously reported for other U.S. states. However, average earnings
replacement rates decline from 95 percent at 4.5 years to 67 percent
at 10 years, even with knowledge of the claim reserves held by the
workers’ compensation insurers in Michigan.
So are the Michigan workers’ compensation benefits adequate?
That perception still remains largely in the eye of the beholder. The
finding that both earnings replacement rates and loss replacement rates
are higher in Michigan than in other U.S. states that have been studied
is encouraging, and it raises questions about the unique aspects of
the Michigan system. Are wage-loss systems inherently superior in
replacing lost earnings? Or is this finding due to the specific method-
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ology adopted for this study? Only more such studies of other states
with different methodologies can tell us. We sincerely hope that such
studies will be forthcoming in the near future.
Notes
1. See the extensive discussion of the issue of adequacy in Hunt (2004),
Chapter 2.
   2. However, there are also five states (including Michigan) that use a formula based on spendable earnings, which is gross earnings less estimated taxes based on family size, and seven states that use some other
percentage of gross earnings (three at 60 percent, three at 70 percent,
and one at 72 percent). See WCRI (2014), Table 4.
3. Contested cases are those in which the employer or insurer disputes
either the work-relatedness or the level of the disability. These cases
generally require an administrative hearing and usually feature legal
counsel for both sides. Disputed cases usually involve more severe disabilities and are considerably more expensive.
  4. Loss of earnings benefits were still available in circumstances that were
“so exceptional” as to create undue hardship under the loss-of-functionalcapacity evaluation method.
  5. This sample represents about one quarter of the indemnity claims in
Michigan. See WCRI (2014) for discussion of the representativeness of
the Michigan Detailed Benchmark/Evaluation sample.
6. This is not strictly correct, since the Michigan workers’ compensation
system uses a benefit formula that aims to replace 80 percent of preinjury spendable earnings, subject to a maximum benefit at 90 percent
of the state average weekly wage. Thus, the system uses the preinjury
wage as the standard and does not aim to replace 100 percent of lost
earnings. However, since the adoption of the comparison-worker analytical model to estimate lost earnings after the injury, it has become
routine to think of the gap between the postinjury earnings of injured
workers and the comparison group as the target for the system.

Chapter 3

A

The Challenge of
Return to Work in Workers’
Compensation Programs

mong the many goals of workers’ compensation programs (prevention, compensation, rehabilitation, etc.), the most recent to emerge
into public policy concern has been the goal of return to work (RTW),
which can be regarded as the ultimate objective of medical care and
rehabilitation services after disability resulting from an industrial
injury or illness. One could argue that this is the best measure of the
value of the social systems that deal with work-related disability—
namely, restoring the person to the previous status quo. Preventing
injuries and illness is paramount; compensating the individuals adequately while healing and rehabilitation take place is critical; but a
return to gainful employment has the potential to allow the injured
worker to resume her/his productivity and quality of life.
For most of the first century of workers’ compensation programs
in the United States, the RTW goal was either left to the parties themselves or managed by the system of vocational rehabilitation that
was also included within these statutory programs. Trained vocational rehabilitation professionals evaluated the level of impairment,
designed programs for rehabilitation, and assisted injured workers
back to gainful employment. However, the length of treatment and
the outcomes achieved were frequently not found sufficient to justify the cost, and many workers’ compensation agencies have moved
away from dependence on formal systems of vocational rehabilitation
(Gardner 1985).
As health care costs rose in an increasingly challenging business climate in the 1980s and 1990s, greater emphasis was placed
by employers on gaining control of the process after injury and illness claims occurred. This chapter will explore research findings and
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policy initiatives that address the return-to-work goal explicitly. It
will highlight early research efforts at the Upjohn Institute that helped
to document the potential of disability prevention and management
through analysis of survey data on workers’ compensation claims in
Michigan.1 And it will provide several examples of state workers’
compensation policy initiatives that have developed to support the
return-to-work goal.

DETERMINANTS OF RETURN TO WORK
Clearly, the determinants of return to work are multidimensional;
they include medical treatment, rehabilitative services, employer policies, injured worker characteristics, job requirements, and many other
factors. The failure to achieve the return-to-work goal arises from the
multiplicity of these contributing causes for disability, perhaps compounded by a general excess supply of labor, which can influence
employer behavior in hiring and retention decisions.2
Obviously, there are important medical issues, such as the type
and severity of the injury, resulting functional impairments and possible comorbidities, timely access to effective treatment and rehabilitation, and many others, that will influence the recovery as well as
what kind of work can be performed after a work injury or illness.
In addition, personal factors of the injured worker come into play.
Beyond the possibility of impaired work skills and productivity, there
are family circumstances and social influences, including the attitudes
and beliefs of fellow workers, the workplace culture, and the very real
fear of potential reinjury.
There are also institutional determinants impacting RTW, such
as employer policies and practices, workers’ compensation disputes
and settlements, insurer behavior, and labor relations. Labor market
dynamics also play a role when an excess supply of labor creates
highly competitive conditions in the labor market, or when deficient
demand due to recession reduces the chance of finding an alterna-
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tive job. The employer-at-injury may have suffered business reverses,
leaving the injured worker with limited alternative work options, or
left out completely and subject to the vagaries of the general labor
market.
There are also policy causes of failure to return to work. One
possibility is that an injured worker might qualify, or think she/he
will qualify, for social insurance benefits other than workers’ compensation. This could make returning to work to meet financial obligations seem unnecessary, or a less appealing alternative. The largest
disability compensation program in the United States is the Social
Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program, administered by the
Social Security Administration and funded by the Old Age, Survivors,
and Disability Insurance (OASDI) payroll tax system. Theoretically,
there should be very little overlap between workers’ compensation
and SSDI populations because the severity of disability required to
qualify for SSDI is very high (disability expected to last more than
one year or result in death). This would rule out all but the most
severely disabled of workers’ compensation claimants (less than 2
percent of the total).
O’Leary et al. (2012) estimate that 7 percent of new SSDI awards
in the state of New Mexico result from workers’ compensation–
covered injuries or diseases. Strikingly, the impact of a compensable
lost-time injury on the likelihood of SSDI receipt some years later
is about the same as aging by 10 years (p. 12). Assuming that these
empirical estimates from New Mexico are representative of the nation
as a whole, there would be as many as 70,000 new SSDI awards to
former workers’ compensation beneficiaries every year. So the relative magnitudes suggest that transitioning to SSDI may be fairly common for seriously disabled workers’ compensation claimants.3
However, a full understanding of the requirements for SSDI eligibility is not widespread, so injured workers may believe they qualify
for benefits when they actually do not. The exact line between meeting and not meeting the requirements in the SSDI disability listings
can be somewhat mystifying, leading to considerable uncertainty
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about who will qualify and to pervasive legal representation and
administrative litigation. Standards also appear to vary somewhat in
their application in different states, as it is a state government agency
that makes the initial determination as to which cases are eligible.4
Thus, seriously injured workers who have used up their workers’
compensation benefits or private disability benefits, or who expect
to do so, may mistakenly regard SSDI as a potential alternative or
supplement to workers’ compensation benefits for work-related injuries and illnesses.5
Disabled workers who become impoverished may also be eligible for state and local welfare assistance and/or federal Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) benefits. So while there are a variety of sources
of income for work-injured employees, none of them provide full
earnings replacement or the typical package of benefits that accompany most full-time jobs. Still, they should be considered a significant
policy factor affecting RTW outcomes for workers’ compensation
programs.
Likely the biggest barriers to RTW are the private decisions
made by employers and employees in our employment-at-will labor
markets. Employers may decide that they do not want to employ an
injured individual any longer. If the ADA or other antidiscrimination
statute does not come into play, that is their right. Employees may
decide that they would prefer not to return to their at-injury job. No
doubt both of these decisions are very common. The fact that they
have not been studied sufficiently reflects the difficulties involved in
researching such private and multidimensional decisions rather than
a lack of public interest.6
The magnitude of the RTW problem has been quantified by a
unique series of interview studies of injured workers. The Workers
Compensation Research Institute (WCRI) conducted studies of completed samples of about 400 workers in each of 15 states (Arizona,
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin) over the period 2013–2015. All of these

The Challenge of Return to Work 35

injured workers missed at least seven days of work because of their
injury. They were interviewed by telephone between 2.8 and 3.0 years
after their injury. Table 3.1 shows the range of RTW results among
the 15 states, but more significantly the high proportion who were not
working about three years later “predominantly due to the injury.”
Those who were not working at the time of the interview ranged from
11 to 19 percent, and those who had never returned to work for more
than 30 days since the injury ranged from 9 to 19 percent. These numbers are concerning. In addition, from 6 to 11 percent of those who
had returned to work reported that they were earning “a lot less” than
before the injury, which further demonstrates the magnitude of labor
market problems encountered by injured workers.7
Last, among those who had returned to work “successfully,”
meaning for at least 30 days, between 19 and 37 percent had different
job duties with the at-injury employer predominantly because of the
injury, and between 2 and 10 percent had a new employer because of
the injury (Savych and Thumula 2016).
While these are somewhat subjective measures gleaned from an
interview study, they indicate the degree of labor market disruption
created by a compensable injury in a typical state. Adding those who
reported that they earned a lot less to those who were no longer working, we get a figure of 18 to 27 percent of workers’ compensation
wage-loss claimants who were still suffering significant economic
loss nearly three years after their injury, the major cause for this being
lack of employment. It is worth noting that these results are roughly
comparable to those for dislocated workers whose employers have
closed completely (Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 1993).
The Emergence of Disability Management as an RTW Solution
During the 1980s and 1990s, largely in response to the spiraling
costs of workers’ compensation insurance, larger corporate employers began to adopt techniques that came to be collectively known as
“disability management.” Disability management refers to the set of
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Table 3.1 Return-to-Work Performance in 15 States
AR

CT

FL

GA

IN

IA

KY

MA

MI

MN

NC

PA

TN

VA

WI

% not working three years after
16
injury, predominantly because
of the work injury
% who never returned to work for 15
30 days within three years after
the work injury
% working at interview who
8
reported earning “a lot less”
because of the injury

15

14

17

11

13

17

17

12

12

19

17

16

13

12

12

14

19

9

14

18

14

9

11

15

15

15

13

10

8

11

8

8

9

7

9

7

11

8

8

8

7

6

NOTE: Based on samples of about 400 workers in each of 15 states. Telephone interviews were conducted from 29 to 40 months after a compensable injury involving at least seven days of lost work time. State response rates ranged from 25 to 31 percent, and the interviews were
conducted in three phases—eight states in 2013, four states in 2014, and three states in 2015.
SOURCE: Savych and Thumula (2016), Tables 3.2 and 3.5.
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practices designed to minimize the disabling impact of injuries and
health conditions that arise during the course of employment. This
includes better medical management, more accommodation of existing limitations, and other such efforts to prevent work disability.
Disability management is not the same as accident prevention,
but rather is broadly focused on preventing the development of work
disability that can follow an initial injury or disease, or on ameliorating the effects of such disability. This might include changing hours
of work, altering work assignments, redesigning specific work tasks,
or other accommodations that make it possible for the impaired individual to return to work despite his or her impairment. Disability management is also much broader than just return-to-work techniques,
but it includes all of those policies and practices that are designed to
minimize the impact of disability in the workforce.
Disability Management, the classic work by Akabas, Gates, and
Galvin (1992), provided the following definition: “Disability management is a workplace prevention and remediation strategy that seeks to
prevent disability from occurring or, lacking that, to intervene early
following the onset of disability, using coordinated, cost-conscious,
quality rehabilitation service that reflects an organizational commitment to continued employment of those experiencing functional work
limitations” (p. 2).
Disability management is time-specific, because it relates to an
individual during a particular period of time, and it is employer based,
because employers generally control the conditions of employment.
Workers’ compensation insurers also practice disability management
as a method of loss control and service to their employer clients.
Disability management supports a win-win philosophy, which
can result in substantial benefits for both employer and employee.
The injured worker returns to employment sooner and suffers less
loss of earnings, as well as very possibly a lower likelihood of permanent disability. The employer gets less production interruption, lower
costs of replacement labor, and likely lower workers’ compensation
costs due to less time off work, resulting in lower benefit payments.8

38 Hunt and Dillender

Figure 3.1 shows the decline in injuries and diseases with days
away from work and the commensurate increase in days of restricted
work activity, as measured by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses (SOII). These trends
appear to reflect the spread of disability management in U.S. private
industry. In the context of a rapidly declining OSHA-reported injury
rate, the number of cases with days away from work as a result of
injury or disease has declined continuously since the late 1980s.
The incidence rate of lost-workday cases has declined by more
than 50 percent since 1985. Yet the number of restricted-work cases
increased at least through 2000, ultimately approaching 42 percent
of the number of cases with days away from work (Ruser and Wiatrowski 2013). While there is no direct measurement of the effect, it
seems likely that an increasing percentage of all OSHA-recordable
Figure 3.1 National Trends in Rates Associated with Lost Workdays
(rates per 100 full-time-equivalent workers), Private
Industry,
1976–1997
National Trends
in Rates Associated with Lost Workdays
4.5

Number of days/100 FTE workers

4.0
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Days-away-from-work case rate

3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0

SOURCE: Ruser (1999).
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cases in the U.S. private sector may be experiencing some application
of disability management aimed at reducing days away from work,
and this is manifested in the rising proportion of restricted-work cases.
Upjohn Institute Research on Impacts of Disability Management
The Upjohn Institute began work on these issues under two
research contracts with the Michigan Department of Labor, beginning
in 1987 and ending in 1993. The first project, funded by the Michigan
Bureau of Workers’ Disability Compensation, sought to explain the
wide differences among employers in claim rates for workers’ compensation benefits. Analyzing administrative data that showed variation of more than tenfold in workers’ compensation claim rates, it was
found that these differences were only partially explained by industry, size of firm, and location (only about 25 percent of the variance
was explained by these factors). Also, high-claim firms had twice as
many accidents but four times as many workers’ compensation claims
(Hunt 1988). This raised the question of whether there were differences in policies and practices of employers that might explain the
differences in performance, and this policy and practice dimension
was probed in a second study with sponsorship from the Bureau of
Safety and Regulation of the Michigan Department of Labor.
The Michigan Disability Prevention Study was a collaborative
effort between the Upjohn Institute, Michigan State University, and
the Bureau of Safety and Regulation (Hunt et al. 1993).9 A mail survey (which achieved a 46 percent response rate) of a random sample
of 220 Michigan establishments with more than 100 employees from
seven industry groups (Food Production SIC 20, Furniture Manufacturing SIC 25, Rubber and Plastics SIC 30, Fabricated Metals SIC 34,
Nonelectrical Machinery SIC 35, Transportation Equipment SIC 37,
and Health Services SIC 80) was conducted in 1991. The research
team had access to the administrative records for workers’ compensation claims for these firms as well.
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Figure 3.2 displays the conceptual model that guided the project. The model sees the company environment as being determined
by dimensions like “people-oriented culture” and “safety leadership”
and mediated by policies of health promotion, safety intervention,
and disability management techniques. The result is a specific level of
disability prevention and management performance, as measured by
accident incidence, disability incidence, and disability duration (Hunt
et al. 1993, Fig. 1).
The study correlated differences in self-reported achievement of
relevant policy and practice dimensions with firm performance on disability outcome measures. The policy and practice dimensions were
developed from an intensive literature search, with review and refinement by a group of expert advisers. From a total of 228 relevant concepts identified in the literature, 139 were selected for possible scale
development. After pilot testing and further expert consultation, a total
of 95 items in eight scales (determined through factor analysis) were
incorporated in the Organizational Policies and Practices (OPP) survey instrument (Habeck, Hunt, and VanTol 1998). The eight scales
were labeled 1) People-Oriented Culture, 2) Active Safety Leadership,
3) Safety Diligence, 4) Safety Training, 5) Disability Case Monitoring, 6) Proactive RTW Program, 7) Wellness Orientation, and 8) Ergonomic Solutions.10
Variation in firm self-reported achievement of these policy and
practice dimensions was correlated with outcome measures, including the OSHA recordable incident rate per 100 employees, the lost
workday case rate per 100 employees, the workers’ compensation
wage-loss claim rate per 100 employees, and the total lost workdays
per 100 employees (Habeck, Hunt, and VanTol 1998).
Three multivariate models were estimated reflecting the underlying conceptual model. The Prevention Model estimated the effect
of preinjury policies and practices in reducing the frequency, severity, and duration of disability resulting from work-related injuries
and diseases. The Disability Management Model estimated the role
of policies and practices that occur after the injury in reducing the
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Figure 3.2 Conceptual Model of Disability Prevention among Michigan
Employers
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SOURCE: Hunt et al. (1993).
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occurrence, the severity, and the duration of disability. The Managerial Model estimated the influence of the specific elements of the company environment on their injury and disability experience.
In each case, the measures were scaled, so the effect of a 10
percent difference in an independent variable (policy and practice)
was expressed in the percentage difference in each dependent variable (disability outcome). The multivariate regression estimates also
controlled for structural variables like employment level of the firm,
multiple-site firms, union presence, self-insurance, and wage level.
The significance of this early study was in its analytical and
design rigor combined with simplicity in presentation. It was not difficult for employers to understand that 10 percent better performance
in Safety Diligence was associated with a 6.6 percent lower incidence
of OSHA recordables and a 16.6 percent lower level of lost workday
cases (Habeck, Hunt, and VanTol 1998). In fact, this study led to great
interest from employers who wanted to improve their performance on
disability prevention and lower their workers’ compensation costs.
Extensive outreach efforts were conducted by the research team and
by the Michigan Bureau of Safety and Regulation.
Overall, the empirical results confirmed that employer policy
and practice dimensions like People-Oriented Culture, Active Safety
Leadership, Safety Training, Safety Diligence, Disability Case Monitoring, and Proactive Return to Work were very effective in explaining
differences among Michigan firms in the incidence of lost workday
cases, workers’ compensation claims, and total lost workdays. And
while this was a cross-sectional study of different firms at a particular point in time, findings were widely interpreted as indicating that
these policy and practice dimensions offered firms the opportunity to
improve their performance through time.
Research has continued using the organizational policies and
practices scale (OPP), developed in the Michigan study, and derivatives of that scale. Ben Amick at the Institute for Work and Health
(IWH), located in Toronto, Ontario, conducted a study of 198 workers with carpal-tunnel-release surgery claims in Maine (Amick et al.
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2000). Other studies include a study of 65 manager-worker pairs in
Ontario (Ossman et al. 2005) and a study of 188 health care workplaces in Ontario (Williams et al. 2007). The results of these additional studies have strongly confirmed the relationship between the
OPP variables and workplace outcomes.
Subsequently, an abbreviated version of the organizational policies and practices survey was incorporated into the Ontario Leading Indicators Project (OLIP), which has been used to survey over
2,000 workplaces in Ontario since 2011. More recently, an even more
abbreviated version of the OPP was field tested by the Workers’ Compensation Board of the Province of New Brunswick (WorkSafeNB).
After a study of about 250 employers, WorkSafeNB adopted the tool
to use in its Focus Firm program, which targets firms with high workers’ compensation claim frequency for their industry. So the practical
usefulness of the research concepts has been confirmed in their adoption by public agencies as well as private employers.
Other Empirical Research on Return to Work
With funding from the California Commission on Health and
Safety and Workers’ Compensation (CHSWC), the RAND Institute
for Civil Justice has conducted several major studies of workers’
compensation, including the return-to-work dimension. In a working
paper, McLaren, Reville, and Seabury (2010) reported the estimated
difference in the number of weeks before return to work between
large firms with a return-to-work program and those without such a
program.
They found four major return-to-work techniques in use by their
sample firms: 1) modified work tasks, 2) modified work station or
equipment, 3) reduced work time and schedule changes, and 4) transfer to a different job. The results, based on a nonrandom survey of
40 large, self-insured employers in California in the year 2000, are
shown in Table 3.2. These firms reported huge impacts of disability management programs, in the range of 40 percent shorter median
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Table 3.2  Estimated Improvements in Weeks before RTW
All workers
PPD claims

Weeks to RTW
without program
Difference with
program
Median change (%)
Mean change (%)

No fixed
effects

Fixed
effects

No fixed
effects

Fixed
effects

9.0
(41.1)
−3.8
(−15.7)
−42.2
−38.2

8.9
(40.8)
−3.6
(−15.1)
−40.4
−37.0

39.7
(69.5)
−18.8
(−25.9)
−47.4
−37.3

35.5
(65.2)
−12.6
(−17.6)
−35.5
−27.0

NOTE: Columns show median number of weeks (means in parentheses).
SOURCE: Adapted from McLaren, Reville, and Seabury (2010).

durations with a RTW program in place (columns 1 and 2). This result
held for all injuries as well as for permanent partial disability (PPD)
cases. The mean differences were almost as large, which is surprising
since long-duration claims would seem to be less amenable to disability management treatments.
Using statistical models to control for characteristics of the
employer (columns 2 and 4) reduced the size of these effects somewhat, but very large differences remain. According to the authors,
“Our findings suggest that return to work programs are highly effective when adopted at large, self-insured firms. . . . Future work should
study how return to work programs can be implemented effectively at
small firms” (McLaren, Reville, and Seabury 2010, p. S-7).
Franche et al. (2005) at the IWH conducted a systematic review
of the quantitative literature on workplace-based return-to-work interventions covering published literature from 1990 through 2003. They
identified more than 4,000 papers in English and French published
during the period. A total of 35 studies were deemed quantitative
in nature, and 10 of these studies, producing a total of 23 scholarly
publications, met their quality appraisal criteria.11 Four of the studies
came from Canada (from three different provinces), three from the
United States (three different states), and one each from Finland, the
Netherlands, and Sweden.
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Data were extracted from these 10 studies and subjected to evidence synthesis analysis.
Three key quantitative outcome dimensions were used to assess
the impact of disability management activities: 1) work disability
duration, 2) associated costs, and 3) quality-of-life outcomes. The disability management activities included early contact with the worker,
work accommodation offer, contact with a health-care provider, ergonomic visits to the work site, replacement staffing, and RTW coordination. Findings were summarized as follows: “There was strong evidence that work disability duration is significantly reduced by work
accommodation offers and contact between healthcare provider and
workplace; and moderate evidence that it is reduced by interventions
which include early contact with the worker by the workplace, ergonomic work site visits, and presence of RTW coordinator” (Franche
et al. 2005, p. 623).
Table 3.3 shows the distribution of disability management interventions and outcomes. It seems that effects of disability management
on quality of life of the injured worker are not strong. However, all
other activities garner at least moderate evidence of impact on work
disability duration and the costs associated with work disability. This
constitutes a strong empirical validation of employer benefits from
disability management techniques. Similar positive results have been
reported in other survey articles, including Tompa et al. (2008) and
van Oostrom et al. (2009).
Table 3.3  Effect of Return-to-Work Programs on Duration of Work
Disability
Effect on disEffect on
Intervention component
ability duration
Cost
quality of life
Early contact by the workplace
Moderate
Moderate Mixed
Work accommodation offer
Strong
Moderate Mixed
Contact with health provider
Strong
Moderate Mixed
Ergonomic work site visit
Moderate
Moderate Mixed
Presence of RTW coordinator
Moderate
Moderate Insufficient
SOURCE: Adapted from Franche et al. (2005), p. 623.
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Another approach is represented by a recent set of studies from
the Stay-at-Work/Return-to-Work Policy Collaborative between
Mathematica Policy Research (MPR) and the Office of Disability
Employment Policy (ODEP) of the U.S. Department of Labor (Bardos
et al. 2015). MPR simulated the private and public costs and benefits
of returning a disabled worker to the job versus replacing that worker.
In such a comparison, it is clear that both the disabled worker and the
federal government will experience substantial financial gains over
the worker’s remaining working life if the disabled worker can be
returned to work. The employer’s financial return depends critically
on the productivity comparison between the disabled worker and the
replacement worker.
In their conclusion, Bardos, Burak, and Ben-Shalom (2015) raise
the possibility of the government providing federal subsidies for lost
productivity due to disability. They believe this is likely to be more
effective than subsidizing the rather minimal costs of workplace
accommodations in promoting RTW.12
Based upon our own experience, we believe it is clear that disability management can prevent or reduce the duration of many workers’ compensation claims. It also seems clear that larger employers
with generous benefit packages find that disability management programs further the interests of both the firm and its employees. What
may not yet be clear is whether these techniques can be effectively
applied in smaller firms with more modest benefit packages and fewer
administrative resources.13 However, as will be shown in the next section, policymakers in several states have been convinced that promoting return to work is in the public interest, and they have proven
to be highly innovative in designing approaches to encourage RTW
programs.
Public Policy Measures to Promote Return to Work
Because of the perceived payoff to disability management techniques and return-to-work programs, especially among larger, self-
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insured employers, several workers’ compensation jurisdictions in
the United States have sought to promote such programs with public
policy initiatives.14 We will review several of these in some detail, but
a brief overview is useful first. These policies have fallen into one or
more of the following approaches:15
Medical Management–Based Methods
Medical management–based methods seek to improve the medical management of work injuries with the objective of reducing losttime, residual-disability, and employer costs. One successful example is the Washington Department of Labor and Industries program
called Centers of Occupational Health and Education (COHE). This
began as an experiment in two areas of the state and has proven sufficiently successful to have been expanded to the entire state by the
2011 legislative reforms to the workers’ compensation system. COHE
is an attempt to increase the availability of specialized occupational
medicine personnel and provide priority medical treatment to injured
workers. A full-scale evaluation of the program at the two pilot sites,
published in 2011, found that injured workers who were treated by
health care providers affiliated with a COHE lost 20 percent fewer
days from work. COHE treatment was found to reduce total medical
and disability costs by $510 per claim in the first year after the injury
(Wickizer et al. 2011).
With more recent expansions from two to four and then to six
COHEs, performance has slipped only slightly. According to an April
24, 2014, briefing, the statistics show a 4.1 day reduction in time loss
per claim, and savings of $480 in the first year. The projected ultimate savings per COHE claim are approximately $1,600 (Washington
State Department of Labor and Industries 2014b).
Methods based on medical management also include treatment
guidelines for specific conditions and attempts to improve information and communication among medical professionals, insurers,
employers, and injured workers and their representatives.
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Incentive-Based Methods
Incentive-based methods attempt to provide monetary incentives for employers or workers to minimize the time lost from work.
The most striking adoption of this method was in California, which
in 2004 established separate tiers of wage-replacement benefits for
permanent disability claims, depending upon whether the at-injury
employer made a qualifying employment offer to the injured worker.
If the employer made such an offer, and the injured worker declined
to accept the offer, weekly benefits would be reduced by 15 percent.
If no qualifying job offer was made by the employer, weekly benefits
would be increased by 15 percent (California Department of Industrial Relations 2014).
Another approach to incentives is illustrated by the Oregon
Employer-at-Injury Program (EAIP). Employers are offered a wage
subsidy of up to 50 percent for two months if they take an injured
worker back under modified work provisions. There is also the possibility of a subsidy to offset the cost of job or work-site modifications required to make such an offer. In addition, when workers are
not able to return to their jobs in the short term but have permanent
work restrictions, another program called the Preferred Worker Program (PWP) can provide a 50 percent wage subsidy for up to six
months and exemptions from workers’ compensation premiums for
that worker for three years (Oregon Department of Consumer and
Business Services 2015).
Accommodation-Based Methods
Particularly since the passage of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) in 1990, which requires accommodation of disabilities by
any employer with more than 15 employees unless it causes “undue
hardship” for the employer, accommodation has become much more
common, including among disability management programs for
workers’ compensation.
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Accommodation to promote employment or return to work for
injured workers can encompass reduction in hours, change in work
assignment, job rotation, specific job modifications, and other similar
methods that promise to improve the worker’s fit with the demands of
employment. Since full implementation of the ADA in 1992, failure
to accommodate a disability leaves the employer open to a potential
civil lawsuit with treble damages, unless accommodating the disability will cause undue hardship for the employer.
The ADA prevents employers from discriminating against current or prospective employees based on disability, in cases where
“disability” means one of the following three things:
1) A physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a
major life activity
2) A record of such an impairment (which might include a
workers’ compensation claim)
3) Being regarded as having such an impairment16
It seems clear that many compensable workers’ compensation
injuries would give rise to a disability under the ADA definition, but
certainly not all claims would. Generally, workers’ compensation
claims that are designated as permanent partial or permanent total
disability claims would probably all potentially be subject to the ADA
(Flynn and Bruyere 2001).
But the legal mandate for accommodation under the ADA should
not divert attention from the return-to-work potential and cost-saving
improvements that drive the disability management movement.
It should concentrate rather than divert the employer’s attention in
dealing with work-related disability. We fear that the employer could
become concerned with building a record that will withstand legal
scrutiny under the ADA rather than trying to maximize the productivity of the injured worker for successful and mutually beneficial RTW
outcomes.
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Productivity-Based Methods
There is also another approach that has been associated with
vocational rehabilitation: providing the injured worker with training
sufficient to support a new occupation in which any residual impairment will be less of an issue. This can be thought of as a “supply
side” approach to accommodating work disability. Workers’ compensation programs have supported this vocational rehabilitation
approach to a greater or lesser extent over the years. However, as in
workforce development programs, the quicker and less expensive job
placement approach based on existing transferable skills has become
dominant. This approach can be expected to lead to lower wages on
average, even if the injured worker can be returned to the original atinjury employer. Training is needed to effectively rehabilitate injured
workers.
However, it is clear that encouraging employer-based disability
management and RTW is now preferred public policy in many states.
Whether through economic incentives or government mandate, asking the “job creators” to find ways to work around individual impairments and restore injured workers to employment is now the “state
of the art.” But there is a wide range of policy devices for encouraging such practices among employers, and we will review some of
the most noteworthy examples here, beginning with the pathbreaking
policies in Oregon.
Some Examples of State Policy Initiatives to Encourage Return
to Work
To determine how prevalent employer-based return-to-work programs are in workers’ compensation programs, the Upjohn Institute
used LexisNexis to survey legislative enactments or administrative
rules that mandated or supported such return-to-work programs. We
found a multiplicity of approaches that explicitly support privatesector employers in efforts to get injured workers back on the job
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after a compensable injury or disease. Some real-world examples are
illuminating.
Oregon
Oregon was the first program to directly incentivize employers to take injured workers back. Beginning in 1987, under pressure
to reduce the costs of workers’ compensation programs in Oregon,
the legislature enacted several measures that dealt with the returnto-work issue. The Preferred Worker Program (PWP) was begun in
1987 to provide wage subsidies, premium exemption, claim cost
reimbursement, and accommodation cost support for permanently
disabled workers’ compensation claimants who were unable to return
to their regular jobs because of their injuries. This was accompanied
by a scaling back of the traditional vocational assistance program in
Oregon. Workers with permanent work-related disabilities receive an
identification card that informs prospective employers that the worker
is eligible for a possible 50 percent wage subsidy for up to six months,
work-site modification expense support, and exemption from workers’ compensation premiums on that worker for three years. There is
no time limit on claiming PWP benefits in Oregon.
In 1993, the better-known “Employer-at-Injury Program” (EAIP)
was added to provide 50 percent wage subsidies for up to three months
for employers of disabled employees engaged in light duty or transitional work assignments. Work-site modification and other expenses
connected with return to work were also covered. The costs of these
programs are paid by the Workers’ Benefit Fund, which is supported
by joint contributions from workers and employers. The assessment
rate has been 3.3 cents per hour since 2013, with half (1.65 cents
per hour) coming from the employer and half from the worker. This
fund also supports cost-of-living adjustments for long-term permanent total disability claimants (Oregon Department of Consumer and
Business Services 2014).
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Utilization of these programs has varied with economic conditions through the years. In 2013, the EAIP benefit costs were $22
million, while the PWP cost was about $6 million. In 2014, over 25
percent of accepted disabling claims had used one or more of the
RTW programs within four years after the claimants’ injuries—i.e.,
since 2010. In 2013, the Oregon Department of Workers’ Compensation approved support for 9,085 placements with 2,143 separate
employers (Oregon Department of Consumer and Business Services
2015). Oregon also maintains a sophisticated follow-up system that
uses quarterly administrative earnings records to compare the earnings of disabled workers against earnings of medical-only claims for
13 quarters (just over three years) after the injury. These statistics
make it possible to measure the impact of these programs.
In 2014, for the cohort of accepted disabling claims from 2010,
those who used any of the RTW programs were 8 percentage points
more likely to be employed than those with similar injuries who did
not use the programs. The advantage in wage recovery was even
greater, at 14 percentage points. On average, those who used the RTW
programs recovered to 100 percent of their preinjury wages, even
controlling for statewide upward trends in wages and employment
(Oregon Department of Consumer and Business Services 2015).17
Note that the EAIP is aimed primarily at workers with temporary
disabilities, while the PWP is for those with permanent disabilities
who still have some work potential. For more severely disabled workers, Oregon still offers its Vocational Assistance Program. This program provides traditional vocational rehabilitation benefits for those
who are permanently disabled and unable to achieve reemployment
at 80 percent of their previous wage level. In 2013, only 377 workers qualified for these benefits (Oregon Department of Consumer and
Business Services 2015).
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Washington
Next door to Oregon, Washington legislators adopted the Washington Stay at Work Program in 2011 as part of a negotiated reform
package for this exclusive state fund insurance system.18 For eligible
employers, beginning in mid-2012, wage reimbursement of 50 percent of base wages is available for up to 66 days, or a maximum of
$10,000 per claim of light-duty or transitional employment. If it is
necessary for the employer to incur any expenses to accommodate
the injured worker’s unique needs, reimbursement is available for up
to $1,000 for training fees or materials, up to $2,500 for special tools,
and up to $400 for special clothing required.
More importantly, the Department of Labor and Industries created Early Return to Work teams in local administrative offices
around the state. When a time-loss claim exceeds 14 days of benefits,
the claim is automatically referred to the Early Return to Work team
in the nearest office. The mission of the team is to facilitate communication between injured workers, health care providers, and employers, with the objective of exploring return-to-work options.
While we are not aware of any empirical evaluations of this program as yet, the utilization has grown rapidly in the first two-and-ahalf years to involve 3,000 employers, 12,000 injured workers, and
$27 million in reimbursements for 2014. L&I reports that the system
savings from the reform package (including Stay at Work) reached
$91 million in 2014, substantially exceeding the original projections
(Washington State Department of Labor and Industries 2014a).
New Hampshire
New Hampshire offers a version of the rehiring requirement for
injured workers. All employers with five or more full-time employees “shall provide temporary alternative work programs to bring
injured employees back to work” (New Hampshire General Court
2016, Chapter Lab 504.04[a]). Furthermore, the rules specify that
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transitional “means the duty elements are variable as the employee’s
work capacity increases” (Lab 504.04[b]). Employers are required
to “develop an outline of each position that details present requirements and essential functions of each job within the organization”
(Lab 504.04[d]) and provide the treating physician with the outline
and task analysis as soon as possible after the injury (Lab 504.04[f]).
Finally, the “employer shall offer a position as approved by the treating physician and the employee shall demonstrate a reasonable effort
to comply” (Lab 504.04[g]).
These provisions are supported by “joint loss-management committees” that are required as well. This provision relates to employers
of 15 or more employees in the state of New Hampshire. While these
committees are primarily concerned with safety and health issues,
they are also charged to “assist with the identification and definition
of temporary, alternate tasks” in support of the return-to-work objective (New Hampshire General Court 2016, Lab 603.02[i]).
New Mexico
The State of New Mexico has followed a similar if less aggressive
approach. Effective in 2013, they imposed a limited rehiring requirement for employers, in which the former employee “is receiving, has
received, or is due to receive benefits under the workers’ compensation act.” If the injured worker applies for her/his former job, or a
modified similar job, and the employer is hiring, “that employer shall
offer to rehire a worker who applies for any job that pays less than the
preinjury job, provided that the worker is qualified for the job and that
the treating health care provider certifies that the worker is fit to carry
out the job offered” (New Mexico Compilation Commission 2013).
Massachusetts
An imaginative program with a very different approach is the
Qualified Loss Management Program (QLMP) for assigned risk
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(residual market) employers in Massachusetts. In 1990, facing a rapidly expanding residual market for employers who could not secure
workers’ compensation insurance in the regular voluntary market,
the Massachusetts legislature adopted a program for residual market employers that provided premium credits for those adopting disability management techniques. A premium credit (i.e., in advance
of performance) of up to 10 percent was offered to employers who
would engage a certified consultant to implement a “loss control
management” program. Furthermore, this credit could be maintained
for up to three years, provided the loss control program continued in
effect for the employer. However, the third year only carried 50 percent of the credit, as the goal was to improve employer performance
and depopulate the assigned risk pool. Subsequently, based upon the
results for the first three years, the program was expanded to a fourth
year, with 25 percent of the original credit available in year four. In
addition, the maximum premium credit was increased to 15 percent to
provide even more incentive for employers.
Most interesting as a program design element, the actual size of
the premium credit is determined by the average credit factor assigned
to the loss management firm, not the employer’s actual performance.
Provided the loss management firm certifies full QLMP participation,
the performance improvements of other firms actually provide the
basis for the premium credit. So the system is built upon the assumption that disability management practitioners can replicate their average loss management performance in any firm.
According to an evaluation done in 1999, the program produced
immediate and sustained benefits for participating employers. In the
first year of the program (September 1990 through August 1991),
QLMP participants showed 13 percent more improvement than nonparticipating employers in the loss ratio (ratio of incurred losses to
standard premium) at first report (after 18 months of experience). In
the second year, the same cohort of employers showed 36 percent
improvement, and in the third year, 40 percent improvement over
nonparticipating employers.
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Furthermore, these results held up through second (30 months
of experience) and third report (42 months of experience)—i.e., as
claims matured over time (Mahler and Blomstrom 1999, Table 3).
So there was clearly an improving result over time for participating
employers, which would seem to validate the program design.
This innovative program is still in effect in Massachusetts (see
www.wcribma.org for more details), and was subsequently emulated
to a greater or lesser degree in workers’ compensation systems in
West Virginia, New Hampshire, and Missouri.
New York
New York has adopted yet another approach. In 2009, the Workplace Safety Incentive Programs were implemented. These are voluntary programs for employers with annual workers’ compensation
premiums of at least $5,000 and an experience rating modification
under 1.3. This means they have a payroll of over $250,000 and a
workers’ compensation claim frequency that was worse than average,
although still not too bad. Such firms can participate in three programs: 1) a Safety Incentive Program, 2) a Drug and Alcohol Prevention Program, and 3) a Return to Work Program.
The program specifications dictate that “an acceptable Return to
Work Program facilitates an employee’s return to work as soon as
medically possible after a job-related injury or illness” (New York
State Insurance Fund 2012). All three programs, referred to as “Code
Rule 60” programs, reward employers who participate with credits on
their workers’ compensation policy premiums. The credit is 4 percent
the first year, reduced to 2 percent thereafter, and is renewable for
three years at a time. It is interesting that the New York State Department of Labor evaluates the application and issues the incentive,
which then must be honored by the insurer. Services under the Return
to Work Program may be provided by the employer, jointly by the
employer and the union, by the union itself, or by an outside provider.
Procedures for ensuring the involvement of the injured employee, a
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designated representative of the employee, and the treating physician
are required (New York State Department of Labor 2016).
Ohio
Another interesting application of disability management principles has been adopted as policy in Ohio, another state with an exclusive fund system. The Health Partnership Program began in 1993.
This is a managed care program originally designed to improve medical care for injured workers in Ohio. It has evolved more recently into
a full disability management program with extensive support available from the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (BWC).19
Ohio’s disability management program (“Remain at Work”)
offers a full range of services, which can be financed with a grant
from the Ohio BWC, resulting in a low-cost way for employers to
gain control of their future workers’ compensation costs. In addition, the Ohio BWC offers a premium discount program (“PDP+”),
which offers up to a 30 percent reduction in the employer’s workers’
compensation premium. It requires the implementation of a 10-step
“Safety and Health Business Plan.” This plan must reduce the claims
frequency and severity for the employer by 15 percent to achieve the
maximum premium discount.
Ohio is also rather unusual in publishing a “report card” on managed-care organizations (MCOs) operating in Ohio. The current version reports the following:
• the number of policies assigned to the MCO
• the number of claims in hand at the end of the year
• timing of the first report (average number of days between the
date of injury and claim filing with the BWC)
• first-report turnaround efficiency (the number of days from
receiving the notice of injury from the employer to the date
the claim is filed with the BWC)
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• the days absent compared to the statewide average, and the
“recent medical” charges (excluding claims in the days-absent
measure) compared to the statewide average (Ohio Bureau of
Workers’ Compensation 2014)
The Ohio BWC publishes these performance statistics on the
MCOs who are operating in the state (currently 16 in number) on
their website annually, enabling comparisons by employers shopping
for these services.
Unfortunately, an evaluation of this program finds that the addition of a performance bonus payment to the program in 1995, as well
as the specific rules around payment of bonuses, partially undermined
the intention. In the final analysis, the managed care organizations in
Ohio were incentivized to reduce the duration of short-term claims
but increase the duration of more serious claims to take them out of
the performance measurement (McInerney 2010).
California
The state of California has struggled with both poor adequacy of
benefits for injured workers and poor affordability for employers for
some time (Boden, Reville, and Biddle 2005). In 2004, the legislature
attempted to tackle their perceived problems with a number of provisions, including a substantial reduction in the level of permanent
disability benefits. There was also an explicit attempt to improve the
return-to-work performance in California.
For employers of at least 50 employees, the statute varies permanent partial disability benefits, depending upon a return-to-work offer.
If the employer, within 60 days of the condition becoming permanent
and stationary, makes an offer of regular work, modified work, or
alternative work for a period of at least 12 months, the permanent partial disability benefit is reduced by 15 percent, regardless of whether
the employee accepts or rejects the offer. Contrarily, if the employer
does not make such an offer, the permanent partial disability benefit
is increased by 15 percent.
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This unique “bump-up/bump-down” provision was in effect from
2005 through 2012. However, it was used sparingly because the timing of the “permanent and stationary” decision on the claim made it
impractical to administer. In the final analysis, employers and insurers
pronounced it “unworkable” (Seabury et al. 2011, pp. 19–20). The
provision was repealed in 2013.
For small employers—those with fewer than 50 employees—
the legislature created a more traditional return-to-work program.
This program provided subsidies for small employers who incurred
expenses for work-site modifications, equipment, furniture, tools,
or other items necessary to accommodate work restrictions of the
injured worker. This program, however, was largely ignored by California employers. According to one source, in the years 2007 and
2008, there were only 36 applications for reimbursement under this
program, of which 11 were granted, for a total of less than $9,000
in expenditures (California Commission on Health and Safety and
Workers’ Compensation 2009).
An additional complication in California comes from the Fair
Employment and Housing Act, which provides protections for individuals with disabilities that limit a major life activity and applies to
employers with more than five employees. While this is a civil rights
law and provides potentially unlimited tort damages, including punitive damages, it was likely beginning to have more traction at about
the same time that the return-to-work provisions were added to the
workers’ compensation law in California (Seabury et al. 2011, pp.
28–30).
Seabury et al. (2011) conclude that changes in the Fair Employment and Housing Act that made it easier for injured workers to file a
claim may have played a significant causative role in improving RTW
results. It is also possible that medical treatment improvements may
have contributed. In addition, they allow that “another possibility is
that the improvement was driven endogenously by the problems with
the system” (p. 68). Things got so bad in California that employers
were forced to pay attention to their spiraling costs of workers’ com-
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pensation. One of the responses was likely improved attention to disability management techniques.

CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, there is no consistent measure of return-to-work
across all state workers’ compensation programs, and there is no
definitive source that tells how much performance on this critical
dimension may have improved. However, while the OSHA incidence
of cases with days away from work has been steadily declining since
the late 1980s, the number of restricted-work cases increased steadily
from the mid-1980s through at least 2000. So the clear implication
is that disability prevention and management programs, which use
restricted work and other techniques to reduce time lost from work,
have been expanding over the past 30 years. Since their focus is to
reduce lost workdays and improve the transition back to work, it
is logical to believe that overall performance on return to work has
improved, especially if there is evidence that more and more employers are using such programs.
But the WCRI worker outcome surveys as well as the studies of
benefit adequacy demonstrate that a significant minority of claimants
do not return to work successfully following a compensable injury.
In addition, average indemnity cost per lost-time claim has increased
rapidly, at 4.8 percent a year from 1995 to 2012 (Antonello 2014). In
the absence of substantial increases in benefit rates, which have not
been seen during this period, this implies a rising average duration for
workers’ compensation indemnity claims, referred to by the NCCI as
rising “severity.”
One possible explanation for this trend has been called “the small
potatoes effect.” It is unlikely that disability management techniques
will have much impact on a really serious injury, as opportunities to
accommodate or ameliorate will be minimal, at least until considerable healing has taken place. But less serious injuries allow maximum
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scope for such interventions, thereby reducing both the incidence
and duration of relatively short-term disabilities. This can cause an
increase in the average duration because of the elimination or reduction of the “smaller,” less expensive claims. It is one of the truisms for
employers that engage in aggressive disability management that their
average measured duration of workers’ compensation claims will
likely increase because the less serious injuries are no longer there to
be counted. It is also true that the “burden” of claiming is relatively
high for minor injuries, making it more attractive to “absorb” such
claims with wage continuation, vacation time, employer-sponsored
health insurance, or other mechanisms.
The growing capability of employers, especially large employers,
to prevent workers’ compensation claims during the last three decades
seems obvious. There is some debate about the extent to which such
efforts result in improved performance for the worker versus claim
suppression and cost savings for the employer (Young et al. 2005).
But the picture is clear—many employers are managing their workers’ compensation claims more effectively. Many injured workers are
realizing better outcomes as well, especially when the less serious
injuries that do not qualify for wage-loss benefits are included. While
all states have not rushed in with programs to support these efforts,
there is enough legislative activity among the states, and enough
diversity in program approach and dimension, to demonstrate that this
is an emerging area of workers’ compensation policy as well.
The lessons learned from this experience seem obvious in hindsight. First, it is clear that disability management techniques do have
the potential to remove many barriers to work and thereby reduce the
incidence of lost workdays. This means reduced workers’ compensation costs for the employer, but also improved chances that an injured
worker will suffer less wage loss from a shorter period of disability. This likely makes it easier to maintain her/his lifestyle during the
period of the disability. Maintaining the connection with work also
increases the likelihood of a successful recovery from the injury or
disease. Given that the same accommodation and amelioration tech-
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niques could be applied to persons with disabilities that did not result
from work injury, there could be a bonus for employers in dealing
with their responsibilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act
as well.20
Second, it is now obvious that the relationship between the atinjury employer and the injured worker is critically important through
the healing and recovery process. Once that connection is lost, the
worker’s chances of returning to work drop precipitously, and the
trajectory of lifetime expected earnings is significantly lowered.21
There is no practical alternative to basing return-to-work efforts in the
employment relationship. Many years of experience with vocational
rehabilitation programs show that it is exponentially more difficult
and more expensive to achieve an alternative employment placement
for individuals who have lost their connection with the original atinjury employer.
Third, while there are some concerns about employers using
disability management techniques to discourage or resist legitimate
workers’ compensation claims, that does not seem a sufficient reason
to restrict or prevent the use of such techniques. And the fact that
employers using these techniques are able to reduce their workers’
compensation costs does not make this a bad deal for workers. In fact,
improving return-to-work performance with disability management
techniques constitutes a genuine win-win situation for employers and
their employees.
Notes
1. We use the term “disability prevention and management” to reference
a proactive, employer-based approach to do three things: 1) prevent the
occurrence of accidents and work-related disability, 2) provide early
intervention services for health and disability risk factors, and 3) foster
coordinated administrative and rehabilitative strategies to promote costeffective restoration and return to work.  See Habeck et al. (1991), p.
212.
   2. See Baldwin, Conway, and Huang (2009) and Galizzi and Boden (2003)
for empirical investigations of some of these causes.
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   3. See Guo and Burton (2012) for a careful study of the influence of workers’ compensation programs on the rate of applications to SSDI.
   4. See Coe et al. (2011) for an investigation of state variation in SSDI
applications and awards.
5. The relationship between benefit payments from workers’ compensation and SSDI depends upon the jurisdiction. By federal law, combined
benefits from workers’ compensation and SSDI are limited to 80 percent
of the preinjury wage level. In 15 states, workers’ compensation benefits are reduced or offset, while in 35 states it is the other way around
and SSDI benefits are reduced while workers’ compensation benefits are
maintained.
6. But see Burkhauser, Butler, and Kim (1995) for an early contribution.
7. There was no measurement of voluntary labor force withdrawal, so
these figures include all those who chose to quit working or were forced
out by their employer. While the respondents did indicate that their labor
force status “was predominantly due to the injury,” that does not exclude
the possibility that the injury caused them to retire early. Whether this is
a “voluntary” retirement is open to debate.
8. It is also true that the methods of “disability management” have been
used by some employers as a way to pressure workers to go back to
work before they are ready, or even to persuade them not to claim workers’ compensation benefits, and generally to take advantage of injured
workers.
9. The full research report is available on the Upjohn Institute website at
http://research.upjohn.org/up_technicalreports/4/.
10. The scales and their items are included in Appendix A of the original
research report, Hunt et al. (1993).
11. This includes the Michigan Disability Prevention Study, described
earlier.
12. For a broader view of reemployment options, see Hollenbeck (2015).
13. It is well established that the closer personal connections in small firms
lead to many of the same methods being applied to prevent separation
of employees after accident or injury.
14. There are also a small number of states that have mandated RTW by
requiring the employer to take the injured worker back under certain
circumstances.
15. The various methods described on the following four pages come from
McLaren, Reville, and Seabury (2010).
16. Americans with Disabilities Act, Title I.
17. This does not mean that such results would be available to all, as there
is likely some preselection involved in such programs.
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18. Washington has a Preferred Worker Program as well. Note that Washington also collects workers’ compensation premiums from workers,
primarily to support medical aid benefits.  Worker contributions account
for approximately one quarter of total system costs for the state fund in
Washington.
19. See www.ohpinc.com for more information.
20. See Gifford and Parry (2016) for evidence on occupational and nonoccupational claims.
21. See Galizzi and Boden (2003) and Baldwin, Conway, and Huang (2009).

Chapter 4

Workers’ Compensation and
Incentives for Preventing Injuries

Work-related injuries and diseases are costly for both workers and

firms. For workers, injuries can interfere with the ability to work,
thus lowering current and future income.1 Work-related injuries are
also associated with depression and anxiety (Asmundson et al. 1998;
Dersh et al. 2002) and may lead to chronic pain. For firms, injuries
to workers disrupt production schedules, increase labor costs, and
have the potential to increase workers’ compensation costs. Injuries
are also costly to firms if firms value their workers’ health and happiness for nonmonetary reasons or feel that injuries lower morale and
productivity. According to Leigh (2011), the total cost of work-related
injuries in the United States in 2007 was $250 billion, which was
more than the cost of cancer ($219 billion), coronary heart disease
($152 billion), or stroke ($62 billion).
While preventing all work-related injuries is not possible, firms,
workers, and the government can all reduce their likelihood through
workplace safety choices. Firms choose safety equipment, safety
training, safety protocol, how much to spend on a safety department,
and the method of production. Workers choose their safety effort and
whether to follow the safety protocol. The federal government monitors workplace safety through the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) and sets fees for noncompliance, while many
state governments have separate OSHAs that perform similar functions. State-level governments also set workers’ compensation policy.
All levels of government can provide information on safety, mandate
that firms use certain equipment or follow certain guidelines, or subsidize firms for following certain practices.
In 1970, the Occupational Safety and Health Act set up a National
Commission on State Workmen’s Compensation Laws to evaluate
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workers’ compensation laws. The commission issued a report that
identified promoting safety as one of the main objectives of workers’ compensation. Workers’ compensation programs can influence
work-related safety in at least three ways. One is that they can provide
preventive consultation services to employers and workers. A second
is that they can provide general information about safety. And third,
they can alter monetary incentives for safety, which is the focus of
this chapter. In this chapter, we explain how workers’ compensation
programs can affect safety incentives, and we provide an overview of
the empirical literature on the safety impacts of workers’ compensation programs.

THE ROLE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN
OPTIMAL SAFETY
The cost of injuries goes beyond medical expenses, disrupted
productivity, and lost wages. Injuries are also costly because they
cause pain and suffering and because the inability to work can harm
a worker’s psyche. From a societal standpoint, an injury should be
prevented if the social cost of the prevention efforts is lower than the
social cost of the injury. The cost of injuries includes their numerous
deleterious effects on workers and their families in addition to all of
their monetary costs. Although injuries clearly have random elements,
through prevention efforts the various stakeholders have the ability to
lower the probability that they occur. Prevention efforts should be
undertaken if the cost of the prevention efforts is lower than the cost
of the injury multiplied by how much the injury probability is lowered
by the prevention efforts. In theoretical economic models with perfect information, no frictions, and actuarially fair insurance, workers’
compensation insurance is unnecessary—optimal safety levels will
be achieved through worker sorting based on job risk and individuals
purchasing insurance (Rosen 1974; Thaler and Rosen 1976).
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According to these economic models, firms differ in their inherent
risks of injuries but can influence the probability of injuries through
spending on safety. Workers differ in their baseline health endowments and in their risk tolerance but can lower their injury probability
by spending more effort on safety or working for a safer firm. To
induce workers to accept a job, firms that engage in risk-filled work
have to pay workers more than they would earn at less risky jobs.
Economists call this extra payment to accept a risky job a compensating differential. Since workers with higher risk tolerances need less of
a compensating differential, they choose riskier jobs than risk-averse
workers.
The fact that firms have to pay compensating differentials for the
risks their workers face provides firms with safety incentives, because
they can lower the wages they have to pay workers by making their
jobs safer. Each firm has the incentive to improve safety until the
cost of improving it is more than the worker values the extra safety.2
Although workers’ compensation insurance is unnecessary in these
models, optimal safety will still be achieved with workers’ compensation insurance as long as firms are perfectly experience rated, which
means their premiums reflect their past claims. If firms are not perfectly experience rated, higher-risk firms will be implicitly subsidized
by lower-risk firms, which will lead to a suboptimal allocation of
resources (Ehrenberg 1988).
In reality, the assumption of perfect information is not met in the
determination of workplace safety for a variety of reasons (Fortin and
Lanoie 2000). Firms and insurers cannot always accurately predict
the incidence of injuries, while workers and firms may be incorrect
in their estimates of occupational risk and of their own influence on
the level of risk. Employers and insurers cannot effectively monitor
employees’ precautions, and insurers cannot monitor firms’ prevention efforts perfectly. Insurers and firms may not be able to determine
whether an injury is work related or even whether the worker is truly
injured. In addition, experience rating is not practical for small firms
in reality, because a large claim could still put them out of business.
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The assumption that workers could buy insurance on their own that
meets their needs and is actuarially fair is not realistic either.
Moreover, some speculate that injured workers sometimes use
other disability insurance or have health insurance cover some costs
of work-related injuries. Access to these other insurance programs
lessens the negative consequences of an injury and means that workers and firms will not focus enough on safety. As a result, more injuries occur than would if information were perfect, and work-related
injuries impose extra costs on society.3

THE IMPACT OF THE INTRODUCTION OF WORKERS’
COMPENSATION ON SAFETY
Prior to workers’ compensation programs being enacted in the
early twentieth century, work-related injuries were addressed by
worker mutual aid organizations and through the tort system. Under
the tort system, workers who were injured on the job and were seeking
compensation had to prove in court that their employers’ negligence
caused their injuries. An employer could avoid a negligence ruling by
showing that the worker’s actions contributed at least partially to the
injury, that the injury was an inherent job risk, or that the carelessness of coworkers contributed to the injury. Because many industrial
injuries were caused by seemingly inherent dangers of work, fault
was difficult to assign under this system (Fishback and Kantor 1996).
As a result, workers rarely won their suits. When workers did win,
the resulting awards reduced the financial stability of firms and were
sometimes large enough to shut down firms.
In systems with negligible transaction costs and perfect information, liability rules have no impact on the allocation of resources
(Chelius 1976). But as has been already discussed, information asymmetries abound with work-related injuries. The assumption of no
transaction cost is not met under the tort system either, because law-

Workers’ Compensation and Incentives for Preventing Injuries 69

suits are expensive. Therefore, safety was suboptimal under the tort
system.
Given that most people tend to be risk averse, they would prefer
reliable payments after injuries rather than the rare possibility of a
large payout. By making the consequences of work-related injuries
less severe for workers, the introduction of workers’ compensation
programs theoretically decreased safety incentives for workers on
average. For firms, safety under workers’ compensation programs
versus the tort system is less clear. If firms are risk neutral, they would
prefer whichever system had the lowest expected payout. Since payouts were lower on average under the tort system (Fishback and
Kantor 1996), injuries would be cheaper for firms under the liability
system than through workers’ compensation. Thus, workers’ compensation would likely increase safety incentives for risk-neutral firms.
However, the many firms that are too small to be risk neutral may
prefer workers’ compensation insurance to the tort system, since one
large payout could force them out of business.
Most research on the safety effects of workers’ compensation
programs has focused on changes to various aspects of the programs
rather than on what the introduction of the workers’ compensation
system did to safety levels, which means that the effect of switching from a tort system to workers’ compensation on safety levels
remains an open question (Morantz 2010). The research that exists on
the safety effects of the shift to workers’ compensation reports mixed
results. Although Chelius (1976) finds that the passage of workers’
compensation laws in the early twentieth century reduced non-motorvehicle deaths, Fishback (1987) finds that the introduction of workers’ compensation to coal mining resulted in a rise in fatal accidents,
because workers’ compensation increased the median compensation
award, which presumably led to workers’ being less safe.
Butler and Worrall (2008) argue that workers’ compensation
improves safety when firms are the low-cost providers of safety but
reduces safety when workers are the low-cost providers of safety.
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They study the impact of federal workers’ compensation introduction
in 1911 on four classes of railroad workers in New Jersey and find that
workers’ compensation reduced injuries for outside workers, who are
high-cost providers of safety, and increased injuries for inside workers, who are low-cost providers of safety. These results suggest that
there was heterogeneity in the responses of different industries and of
different types of workers to the introduction of workers’ compensation programs a century ago.
As Texas is one of the only states where firms do not have to purchase workers’ compensation insurance, as well as the state that has
had nonmandatory workers’ compensation the longest, comparisons
between Texas firms with workers’ compensation insurance and those
without it (nonsubscribing firms) can provide valuable insights into
the role of workers’ compensation in achieving a safe work environment. Butler (1996) studies differences in injury rates between firms
that purchase workers’ compensation insurance and firms that do not
and finds that both types of firms have similar fatality rates. He finds
that nonsubscribing firms have slightly higher nonfatal injury rates
and argues that this is likely because nonsubscribers tend to offer
occupational injury plans that provide first-day wage-replacement
benefits, which encourage workers with minor injuries to report their
injuries. Butler concludes that safety levels are likely similar between
subscribing and nonsubscribing firms in Texas.
In her survey of large firms who opt out of workers’ compensation insurance in Texas, Morantz (2010) confirms that most firms
that opt out have alternative occupational-injury insurance plans.
That most firms have an alternative occupational injury plan suggests
that firms prefer having insurance to the possibility of being sued.
Morantz finds that the majority of large firms that opt out do it to save
money, and that about one-third of firms report that they have better
safety outcomes with occupational injury plans than they did with
workers’ compensation insurance.

Workers’ Compensation and Incentives for Preventing Injuries 71

MEASURING OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
Measuring workplace safety is necessary for benchmarking safety
levels and for determining what factors affect workplace safety, but
collecting useful and reliable safety measures is a major challenge.
Most research focuses on rates of reported injuries or on workers’
compensation claims. The most commonly used data are the injury
rates collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) through the
Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses (SOII). The SOII collects injury counts from a sample of firms that are required by OSHA
to maintain records of injuries. The SOII also collects the number of
employee hours worked at establishments and uses this information
to construct injury rates. The published data set includes the number of injuries with lost workdays, the number of injuries with no
lost workdays, and the number of workers at the establishment. An
advantage of these data is that the record keeping is required by the
federal government, which means the data include information from
all states.
While the BLS data are likely the best available measure of occupational health and safety outcomes, the SOII has three major shortcomings. First, the survey does not include all workers. Specifically,
the survey does not include self-employed workers, farm workers,
firms with 10 or fewer employees, or any government workers. Second, the survey misses many occupational diseases, especially those
that take a long time to develop. Finally, as with any data on injuries,
injuries in the OSHA logs must be reported by workers and recorded
by firms, which means misreporting is a concern. For more information on these data, refer to Ruser (2008).
Another way to measure workplace safety is to examine workers’ compensation claims. An advantage of these data is that they are
more detailed than the BLS data, in that they contain more information about the injury, its treatment, and characteristics of the worker.
Workers’ compensation data may also include injuries and illnesses
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not contained in the SOII. But as with the BLS data, misreporting is
also a concern with workers’ compensation claim data.
Injured workers may not file for workers’ compensation because
of concerns associated with filing a claim. Filing a workers’ compensation claim may be costly if employers dissuade people from filing
for workers’ compensation because they fear workers’ compensation
claims will increase their premiums. Injured workers also might not
want to deal with the paperwork and bureaucracy of workers’ compensation, or they may fear that they will be called on to prove that
their injury was caused by work.
Some workers may feel there is a stigma associated with filing
for workers’ compensation, while others may worry that their standing with the employer will depreciate while they recover from their
injuries. Finally, receiving workers’ compensation benefits is not
guaranteed even if one files a claim. Biddle (2001) shows that high
denial rates of workers’ compensation claims are associated with
lower application rates. In their survey of injured Michigan workers, Biddle and Roberts (2003) find that a majority of injured workers with work-related injuries do not file for workers’ compensation
benefits. Lakdawalla, Reville, and Seabury (2007), using data from
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, confirm that many workers who report being injured on the job to the survey report that they
did not file for workers’ compensation. Another issue with workers’
compensation data is that the data typically come from one particular
state, which makes generalizing the results difficult. States also have
different reporting and data collection procedures, which complicates
efforts to combine workers’ compensation data from multiple states.
The National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI) provides
one of the few publicly available resources on different states’ workers’ compensation premiums and claims. To produce these data,
NCCI surveys workers’ compensation insurers each year about the
premiums they receive and the claims they pay. NCCI publishes these
state averages each year for most states in its Annual Statistical Bulletin (NCCI 2014).
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Individual-level government-collected survey data, such as the
National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) and the March Current
Population Survey (CPS), provide other measures of safety in the
United States and have several advantages over other data. Unlike
workers’ compensation data, survey data contain detailed information about a sample of all workers, regardless of whether they claim
workers’ compensation. This more detailed information about workers includes demographics, education, and sometimes information on
family members, work, and medical histories.
The NHIS is collected by the National Center for Health Statistics and asks various questions about injuries, including whether
injuries are work-related, the types of injuries, whether the injuries
caused individuals to miss work, and what types of medical care
workers received. The NHIS also collects other relevant demographic
and health information. In addition to relying on proxy respondents,
the public-use NHIS does not contain state identifiers, meaning crossstate comparisons are not possible. Because much of workers’ compensation research focuses on differences across states, the lack of
state identifiers greatly reduces the NHIS’s use to researchers.
The March CPS asks respondents if they have received workers’ compensation income in the past year. This information has
been frequently used by researchers. Although it is not a panel data
set, respondents can be linked across surveys, which gives the data
a panel component. A shortcoming of CPS data is that they contain
no details about injuries, workers’ compensation payments, or medical treatment. Other individual-level surveys with injury and workers’ compensation information are the Survey of Income and Program Participation, the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics, and the
National Longitudinal Surveys of Youth.4
While injury rates and workers’ compensation claims are a natural measure of workplace safety, the fact that workers, treating physicians, or firms have to report these injuries is problematic. As will be
explained later, any factor that affects safety incentives also influences
the decision to report injuries, which means reported injury rates are
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a flawed measure of safety. As Morantz (2010) explains, “Probably
the single most important obstacle [to estimating the effect of workers’ compensation on safety] is the paucity of truly exogenous safety
metrics that are invulnerable to changes in over- or under-reporting.”
One measure that may have fewer reporting concerns than injuries is occupational deaths from traumatic injuries, which are impossible for workers to misreport and difficult for firms to misreport. In
addition to collecting injury information, the BLS also maintains a
census of occupational deaths, called the Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI). Federal law requires firms to notify OSHA
within eight hours of an occupational death. The BLS collects this
information from OSHA and supplements it with other data sources
such as death certificates and workers’ compensation records to produce the CFOI. Unlike with the SOII, the CFOI includes publicsector and self-employed workers. Prior to the BLS producing the
CFOI, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH) produced the National Traumatic Occupational Fatality
surveillance system, using death certificates. Although occupational
deaths from traumatic events are more likely to be reported correctly,
occupational deaths from slowly developing diseases are still subject
to substantial reporting biases.5

TRENDS IN WORK-RELATED INJURIES
Figure 4.1 plots injury rates from the BLS data since 1975 and
shows that reported work-related injury rates in the United States have
been falling since the 1990s. The 1.7 injuries with lost workdays per
100 workers in 2013 is 59 percent smaller than the equivalent 1990
rate, while the 1.6 injuries without lost workdays per 100 workers in
2013 is 66 percent smaller than the 1990 rate. The injury rate for men
is approximately 23 percent higher than for women, likely reflecting
that men are in jobs with more manual labor. Sprains, strains, and
tears account for roughly 40 percent of injuries.
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Figure 4.1  Occupational Injuries per 100 Workers in Private Industry,
1975–2013
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NOTE: The y axis represents number of injuries of each type per 100 workers. Total
lost workday cases include those with days away from work and those with restricted work activity. For 1978, 1979, 1983, and 1984, the BLS did not include small
employers in low-risk injuries in the survey, so the BLS imputed these data. Beginning in 1992, the data exclude fatalities.
SOURCE: Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses, from the BLS.

As with occupational injuries, occupational deaths have fallen
since the 1990s. Figure 4.2 shows the number of occupational deaths
each year reported in the CFOI from 1992 to 2013. In 2013, 4,585
occupational deaths occurred. Of these, 41 percent occurred because
of transportation injuries; 17 percent from violence by people or
animals; 16 percent by contact with objects and equipment; 16 percent from falls, slips, and trips; 7 percent from exposure to harmful substances or environments; and 3 percent from fires and explosions. Men account for the vast majority of occupational deaths (93
percent). The highest death rates come from agriculture (23.2 deaths
per 100,000 full-time equivalent [FTE] workers), transportation and
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Figure 4.2 Number of Fatal Work Injuries, 1992–2013
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SOURCE: BLS Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries. Data from 2001 exclude occupational deaths from the September 11 terrorist attacks.

warehousing (14.0 deaths per 100,000 FTE workers), mining (12.4
deaths per 100,000 FTE workers), and construction (9.7 deaths per
100,000 FTE workers).
No consensus has been reached about why injury rates and deaths
have fallen so dramatically. Some have speculated that the decline in
injuries comes from shifts in what types of industry are most prevalent. Indeed, the injury rate varies a lot by industry, and the industrial
mix of the United States has changed over the past few decades. Figure 4.3 illustrates the U.S. economy’s transition to being more service
oriented. In 1975, there were approximately 85 percent more workers
in construction, manufacturing, mining, and logging than there were
in professional services, education, and health. By 2013, the share of
workers in professional services, education, and health was more than
double the share in construction, manufacturing, mining, and logging.
Although these patterns are consistent with shifts in industry
driving the lower injury rates, the significant decline in injury rates
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Figure 4.3 Private Industry Shares, 1975–2013
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has also occurred within industries, which suggests that changes in
the industrial composition have not, by themselves, driven the fall in
injury rates. For instance, manufacturing was one of the more dangerous industries in 1994, with 12.2 injuries per 100 workers. By 2013,
the injury rate had fallen to 4.0 injuries per 100 workers in manufacturing. Furthermore, it is not clear that the industries that dominate the
U.S. workforce now are safer than the industrial composition of past
decades. While the professional and business services sector had an
injury rate of less than 2.0 injuries per 100 workers in 2013, the health
care sector had an injury rate of 4.7 injuries per 100 workers, which is
the highest of any of the BLS’s broad injury categories.
Researchers have offered multiple alternative explanations for
declining injury rates and occupational deaths. Boden and Ruser
(2003) argue that workers’ compensation reforms that made filing
for workers’ compensation more difficult suppressed the reporting
of injuries, while Barkume and Ruser (2001) contend that deregulation of workers’ compensation increased safety. Conway and Svenson
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(1998) argue that workers’ compensation reforms decreased injury
rates and that unions, employers, and workers’ compensation insurers
have developed a better understanding of workplace hazards. Ussif
(2004) claims that the gradual improvement over time of technology,
information, and safety initiatives is what has been responsible for the
decline in injury rates.
Regardless of the reason for the decline, the fall in the number
of reported injuries and illnesses has translated into workers’ compensation insurers paying less in benefits. Figure 4.4 shows cash and
medical payments from 1980 to 2012. From the early 1990s, when
benefits reached a maximum, until 2012, workers’ compensation cash
benefits per $100 of covered wages fell by 48 percent, which mirrors
the trend in lost workday injuries. Workers’ compensation medical
benefits per $100 of covered wages fell only by 21 percent during this
Figure 4.4  Workers’ Compensation Medical and Cash Benefits per
$100 of Covered Wages, 1980 to 2012
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time period, likely because the price of medical care rose dramatically
over the period.

THE THEORETICAL EFFECT OF WORKERS’
COMPENSATION BENEFITS AND EXPERIENCE
RATING ON SAFETY
The benefits paid from workers’ compensation programs have the
potential to influence safety incentives, since they change the cost of
injuries for workers and for firms. Higher medical or wage-loss benefits make injuries less costly for workers, which gives them incentives
to take more risks and to pay less attention to safety. Therefore, higher
benefits have the potential to lead to lower safety efforts by workers
and higher injury rates from these lower efforts.
The incentive effects of workers’ compensation benefits for firms
come from the fact that many firms are experience rated, meaning
their premiums are based on their previous claims experience. The
premium of an experience-rated firm is a weighted average of the
premium based on the risk of the occupations of workers at a firm and
the firm’s actual loss experience, where the weight placed on actual
loss experience grows with firm size. Firms that self-insure bear all of
the costs of workers’ compensation benefits directly, which is essentially full-experience rating.6 For experience-rated firms, anything
that raises the amount paid out to workers through workers’ compensation will lead to higher workers’ compensation premiums, which
gives firms an incentive to increase safety efforts.
These countervailing influences of benefits on workers and
firms mean the net effect of higher workers’ compensation benefits
on safety is theoretically ambiguous; therefore, determining the net
effect requires empirical tests. However, research that studies how
features of workers’ compensation affect safety runs into a major
empirical challenge, in that any factor that makes receiving workers’

80 Hunt and Dillender

compensation more attractive to workers or that increases the cost of
workers’ compensation claims for firms may have reporting effects
in addition to safety effects. Workers have greater incentives to file
for workers’ compensation when benefits increase, because filing
is now more valuable for them. Similarly, benefit increases provide
experience-rated firms with incentives to discourage workers from
filing and to increase claims management practices, which are strategies to reduce workers’ compensation costs without increasing safety.
Beneficial claims-management practices include taking proper care
to make sure workers fully recover from injuries and accommodating
workers as they return to work. Perverse claims-management practices include pressing workers to return to work before they have fully
healed and contesting workers’ valid injury claims.
These reporting incentives mean that studies that examine how
injury rates change after workers’ compensation benefits change are
estimating the net effect of benefits on firms’ and workers’ safety and
reporting actions. Estimating the effect of benefits on claiming rates
is the goal for many studies because they are interested in understanding the financial impact of benefit changes on workers’ compensation
claims and costs, but these empirical challenges complicate studies
examining the effects of workers’ compensation benefits on safety.

THE EFFECT OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BENEFITS
ON SAFETY
The Effect on Nonfatal Injury Rates
A large empirical literature has examined the effect of workers’
compensation benefit increases on injury rates and claiming behavior.
Chelius (1982) and Ruser (1985) both use BLS data aggregated by
industry classification to study how differences in workers’ compensation benefits are correlated with injury rates. Chelius finds that an
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industry having 10 percent higher workers’ compensation benefits is
associated with a 1.2 percent higher rate of lost workday cases. Ruser
finds that having 10 percent higher benefits is associated with 1.2 to
3.1 percent more lost workday cases. Both studies find suggestive
evidence that there is a smaller positive correlation between benefits
and rates of injuries without missed days of work.
Butler and Worrall (1983) estimate the effect of benefits on workers’ compensation claims in 35 states by using workers’ compensation
data from NCCI, aggregated at the state and year level. They find that
10 percent higher benefits are associated with a 4.1 percent increase
in claims. They also find that the length of the waiting period before
workers can receive cash benefits lowers the frequency of temporary
total and minor permanent partial disabilities but not major permanent partial disabilities. These early studies all imply that workers’
claiming or safety decisions are influenced by benefit levels.
The conclusions of these first studies are based on differences in
benefit rates across states and industries and do not control for unobserved differences across states that may lead to high workers’ compensation benefits and high injury rates. An issue with these methods
is that high-risk industries or states may offer more generous benefits
as a way of enticing workers into risky jobs, which would lead to a
positive correlation between benefits and injuries even if benefit rates
had no independent influence on injury rates.
Later research examines injury rates after states change their
benefits, so the results are robust to unobserved differences across
states. Krueger (1990) uses data from the March CPS matched with
workers’ compensation benefits in the mid-1980s and estimates that
a 10 percent increase in workers’ compensation benefits increases
workers’ compensation receipt by about 7 percent. Thus, even after
accounting for unobserved differences, early studies found that workers’ compensation benefits have a larger impact on workers’ actions
than on firms’ actions, since claims and benefit payments increased
in response to a rise in the schedule of benefits. If firms’ actions had
dominated, there would have been a decrease.
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Despite the results of early work, more recent research that
studies longer periods of data and also uses state benefit changes in
workers’ compensation benefits does not find large impacts of benefit
increases on injury rates or workers’ compensation claims. Guo and
Burton (2010) study BLS injury data from the 1980s and 1990s and
find that a 10 percent increase in benefits has little or no impact on
injury rates. Bronchetti and McInerney (2012) use 25 years of March
CPS data and find that a 10 percent increase in workers’ compensation benefits increases workers’ compensation receipt by less than 1
percent. Bronchetti and McInerney attribute their smaller estimates
of the effect of benefits on workers’ compensation receipt to more
flexibly controlling for a person’s past wages, but they also find that
workers have been less responsive to benefit changes since 1990.
These more recent results suggest no significant effect of benefit
rates on workers’ safety choices. One possible reason that workers
may not respond to benefit changes by altering their safety effort is
that the changes to workers’ compensation benefits, while large in
some ways, are small compared to the effects on workers’ health. For
instance, a 10 percent increase in the maximum weekly benefit could
have a major impact on workers’ compensation costs for firms but
would be less than $100 per week for workers in most states, which
may not be enough to affect safety decisions when considering the
long-term impact of an injury or disease on the worker’s health.
Studying benefit changes is a common and generally accepted
research method in economics. Given that there are vast unobserved
differences across states and industries, research that can compare
a treatment group to a control group is a major step forward over
early research. However, studies using these methods make the
critical assumption that no other unobserved changes are correlated
with workers’ compensation benefit increases. Benefit increases that
accompany other policy changes would muddy the estimates of the
effect of benefit increases. For instance, if states increase benefits
while also passing other workers’ compensation policies to increase
nonmonetary benefits for workers, the effect of benefits on workers’
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compensation claims or injuries would be overestimated. But if states
increase benefits and cut costs in other ways to keep employer costs
down, the effect of benefits on workers’ compensation claims or injuries would be underestimated.
Heterogeneous Effects for Experience-Rated Firms
Regressing injury rates or workers’ compensation claims on benefit levels reveals the net effect of workers’ compensation benefits on
reported injuries resulting from both firms’ and workers’ responses
to benefit increases. To study the effects on firms and workers separately, researchers test for different effects for experience-rated firms.
Experience-rated firms have an incentive to improve safety and
decrease injury reports after benefit increases, while only workers
have safety and reporting incentives from benefit changes at nonexperience-rated firms.7 In studying experience rating, researchers
run into another data limitation in that data sources do not typically
contain information on which firms are experience rated. This limitation results in researchers having to infer whether firms are experience rated, typically by using firm size. Even though firm size is
likely a good proxy, data still do not include information about the
degree of experience rating, leading to measurement error.
In their studies, Chelius and Smith (1993) and Ruser (1985) both
use the average number of employees at firms within industries as a
proxy for firm size and assume that industries with higher average
workers per firm are subject to a greater degree of experience rating.
Chelius and Smith do not find that industries with large firms have
different responses to benefits in terms of their injury rates, compared
to industries with smaller firms. Ruser, however, uses a finer industry
classification and finds that the effect of the interaction between firm
size and benefits on injury rates is negative. This means that higher
benefits have less of an effect on the frequency of injuries in industries with firms that are more likely to be experience rated.
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In another study, Ruser (1991) constructs a panel data set by
matching the BLS’s injury data to the BLS Current Employment
Survey for manufacturers, which allows him to estimate panel models because he can examine how injury rates change within firms
after benefits change. He finds that a 10 percent increase in benefits
increases injury rates by 3.8–7.7 percent in establishments with fewer
than 100 employees, but only by 1.8 percent in establishments with
more than 500 workers. The large positive effect of benefit increases
on injury rates suggests that benefit increases do cause workers to
report more injuries. The smaller interaction of benefits and firm size
indicates that firms that are likely experience rated take actions to
reduce reported injuries, either by improving safety or by discouraging reporting.
Effects on Occupational Deaths and on Different Types
of Injuries
While studies focusing on heterogeneity between small and
large firms allow for testing whether experience-rated firms take
actions to lower reported injuries, these studies still cannot determine
whether the observed changes result from firms improving safety or
from firms discouraging workers from reporting injuries. To separate
safety effects from reporting effects, studies examine different types
and severities of injuries. Presumably, misreporting would be more
difficult for workers with severe injuries or injuries that are easily
verifiable.
One set of studies focuses on death rates. With deaths, workers make no reporting decisions, so benefit increases do not result in
workers being more likely to report injuries or firms being more likely
to discourage reporting. Moore and Viscusi (1989) study the effect of
benefit rates on death rates using NIOSH’s National Traumatic Occupational Fatality data on workplace fatalities, while Ruser (1993)
studies the effect of benefits on death rates from the BLS injury data
matched to firms.
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Both Moore and Viscusi (1989) and Ruser (1993) find that death
rates decline with benefits and interpret their results as evidence
that increasing benefits increases safety. This in turn reinforces the
conclusion that the increase in occupational injuries accompanying
higher benefits may be from reporting effects on workers.
Another set of studies argues that if workers’ compensation
claims increase only because of reporting, then harder-to-diagnose
injuries would respond to benefit increases, while easier-to-diagnose
injuries would not. Ruser (1998) uses BLS data and finds that higher
benefits increase the number of hard-to-verify injuries relative to
easy-to-verify injuries. Using panel data on the Quebec construction
industry, Bolduc et al. (2002) also find that workers’ compensation
benefits increase the reporting of difficult-to-diagnose injuries but not
easy-to-diagnose injuries. These results indicate either that workers
have more control in avoiding easy-to-verify injuries like strains and
sprains or that reporting incentives dominate safety incentives for
workers.8

THE EFFECT OF EXPERIENCE RATING
A variety of papers focus on the direct effects of experience rating rather than on the heterogeneous effects of benefit increases on
experience-rated firms. Most of these studies cover Canadian workers’ compensation, likely because several recent Canadian reforms
have shifted experience-rating arrangements and provide natural
experiments.
Bruce and Atkins (1993) examine the impact of the introduction
of experience rating in Ontario’s construction and forestry industries on fatality rates. They find that experience rating is associated
with declines in fatality rates, which suggests that experience rating
improves safety. Campolieti, Hyatt, and Thomason (2006) examine the impact of the introduction of experience rating on workers’
compensation claims in British Columbia. After British Columbia
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introduced experience rating, lost-time claims, medical claims, and
short-term disability claims all fell, while long-term disability claims
increased. Campolieti, Hyatt, and Thomason argue that the increase
in long-term claims might arise because most of the benefits for these
claims are not paid until after the experience-rating window has
closed, which suggests firms might save money by shifting workers
with more severe injuries to long-term claims so that their experience-rating factor is not affected.
Tompa et al. (2013) study the effect of a 2004 Ontario policy
change that increased the degree of experience rating. They find that
experience rating decreases the number of reported injuries, especially for injuries that are easy to dispute. Tompa et al. interpret this
result as evidence that firms rely on perverse claims management
practices to lower costs rather than on safety improvements.
Other research surveys firms directly. Although surveying
employers has a disadvantage in that firms may not be forthcoming
in their responses, it has the advantage of providing information on
actual safety efforts rather than on proxies for safety. Kralj (1994) surveyed Ontario employers with experience rating and finds that these
firms report expanding both safety efforts and claims management
efforts because of experience rating. Thomason and Pozzebon (2002)
surveyed Quebec manufacturers to explore the relationships among
experience rating, investment in occupational safety and health, and
claims management practices. They find that experience-rated firms
appear to devote more resources to safety practices, such as having
injury prevention staff and incentivizing safety for their workers. But
they also find that firms increase claims management by challenging
more claims and encouraging workers to return to work sooner after
injuries.
In addition to providing firms with incentives to discourage the
reporting of work-related injuries, another shortcoming of experience
rating is that it may not provide proper incentives for firms to focus
on preventing occupational diseases that may take several years to
develop.
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Firms would underinvest in preventing slow-to-develop diseases
if they expected workers to retire or change employers before the
occupational disease manifests or if it would not surface until after
the experience-rating period ended. For these reasons, even a perfectly experience-rated firm may have more workers with occupational diseases than would be optimal. For similar reasons, firms may
not have proper incentives to make sure workers recover fully from
their injuries.

EFFECTS OF OTHER ASPECTS OF WORKERS’
COMPENSATION ON SAFETY
In addition to the level of workers’ compensation benefits and
the impact of experience rating, any aspect of workers’ compensation that makes obtaining workers’ compensation benefits easier or
improves workers’ experience with workers’ compensation has the
potential to affect safety incentives. In response to the National Commission report, mentioned on pages 65–66, which found that workers’
compensation benefits were inadequate, many states increased workers’ compensation benefits in the 1980s. As a result, the benefits paid
from workers’ compensation rose dramatically in the 1980s, which
can be seen in Figure 4.4 on page 78. These increases in the amount
of benefits paid resulted in large increases in workers’ compensation premiums for employers. In response to these rising premiums,
many states introduced workers’ compensation reforms in the 1990s
to lower workers’ compensation costs. These reforms included the
following six:
1) Requiring workers to demonstrate disability with objective
medical evidence
2) Restricting or eliminating workers’ choice of physician
3) Capping legal fees or shifting the payment of attorneys’ fees
from insurers to injured workers
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4) Eliminating compensation for the aggravation of a preexisting condition or for a condition related to the aging process
5) Increasing fraud detection by raising the penalties for fraudulent claims or by establishing fraud investigation units
6) Requiring that work be a major or predominant cause of the
injury
Ruser, Pergamit, and Krishnamurty (2004) study the effects of
restricting physician choice, increasing fraud detection, and restricting the types of injuries eligible for workers’ compensation. Since
these changes make filing for workers’ compensation more difficult
and lower the probability of receiving workers’ compensation benefits, these laws increase workers’ safety incentives while reducing firms’ safety incentives. Despite the theoretical basis for safety
changes, Ruser, Pergamit, and Krishnamurty find no change in the
likelihood that individuals in the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth were injured or filed for workers’ compensation benefits,
suggesting either that the reforms had no safety effects or that the
counteracting effects offset each other. The 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth has the appealing advantage of following individuals over time, meaning compositional changes to the labor force
cannot drive the effects.
Boden and Ruser (2003) study those states that restricted provider choice as well as states that began requiring objective evidence
for workers’ compensation claims using BLS establishment-level
data. They compare how injury rates changed over time in states that
modified their laws compared to how injury rates changed over time
in states that did not modify their laws. They find that provider choice
has no appreciable effect on injury rates, while more stringent evidence requirements significantly decrease reported injury rates and
can account for between 7.0 and 9.4 percent of the decline in reported
injuries from 1991 to 1997.
Workers’ compensation insurance has traditionally been subject
to a variety of price regulations, but, beginning in the 1970s, some
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states began to relax these regulations. Barkume and Ruser (2001)
assess the effects in states that no longer require preapproval of insurance prices and the effects in states that no longer have rating bureaus
that determine all workers’ compensation insurance prices. They find
that in addition to lowering workers’ compensation premiums, states
no longer requiring preapproval also led to reductions in BLS injury
rates.
Barkume and Ruser (2001) interpret these results to mean that
allowing insurers to charge rates that more closely reflect firms’ risk
of losses encourages firms to improve safety. These results provide
more evidence that having firms pay premiums that reflect their own
risk factors encourages firms to improve safety.
However, as discussed throughout this chapter, having premiums that more closely match expected losses also encourages firms
to increase claims management practices. Thomason, Schmidle, and
Burton (2001) consider how competition influences safety by comparing BLS injury rates in states with three different insurance systems: 1) states with exclusive-fund workers’ compensation insurance,
2) states that permit only private insurers to issue policies, and 3)
states with competitive state funds. They find that states with exclusive-fund workers’ compensation insurance have the highest injury
rates, followed by states with only private insurers and then by states
with competitive state funds. These results provide more evidence
that competition in the insurance market can lower reported injury
rates. The likely mechanism is through improving risk-based rating
and more accurate insurance pricing, but we still cannot determine
whether the lower injury rates are from safety effects or reporting
effects.
Another study examines the safety effects of firms having large
deductibles for their workers’ compensation policies, which a majority of states permit. With large deductibles, even smaller firms are
essentially self-insured until they reach the deductible, which gives
them an incentive to improve safety levels. Although large deductibles may still carry too much risk for small firms, medium-size
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firms can realize lower premiums from investing in safety but still be
covered in the case of a catastrophic event. Shields, Lu, and Oswalt
(1999) use Texas workers’ compensation claims data and find that
firms that adopt high-deductible policies experience immediate
declines in large indemnity claims and delayed effects on reducing
other workers’ compensation claims. They interpret these results to
suggest that improving safety takes time but that firms can increase
claims management practices quickly. At any event, the evidence is
very strong that more direct employer incentives lead to lower workers’ compensation claims incidence, whether from improved safety or
from more aggressive claims management.

DIRECT WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
SAFETY INTERVENTIONS
Many states take a more direct approach to promoting safety
by encouraging or requiring firms to develop their own safety and
prevention programs. In several states, incentives provided through
workers’ compensation are instrumental in encouraging these programs. Examples of workers’ compensation programs encouraging or
requiring safety programs include the following:
• In Massachusetts, assigned risk firms receive a workers’ compensation premium credit for enrolling in a loss management
program.
• North Dakota offers a 5 percent annual discount on workers’
compensation premiums for firms that enroll in a risk management program.
• Pennsylvania workers’ compensation offers a 5 percent discount on workers’ compensation insurance premiums for firms
with a certified joint labor management safety committee.
• From 1991 to 2005, Texas workers’ compensation had a program that mandated that the most hazardous workplaces im-
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plement illness and injury prevention programs. This program
was dropped when Texas made its law nonmandatory.
Although state workers’ compensation programs generally report
that these programs reduce injuries, very few of these programs have
been studied by independent researchers. An exception is the Pennsylvania program, which Liu et al. (2010) study by examining factors that affect program participation and by estimating the impact of
safety programs on injury rates. To do this, they combine Pennsylvania workers’ compensation data with unemployment insurance data
and use propensity score matching to create a control group. They
find that large firms, firms with higher injury rates, firms in high-risk
industries, and firms without labor unions were more likely to join the
safety committee program and less likely to drop out. Although their
results show that firms that complied with the requirement to train
their safety committee members experienced reductions in injuries,
noncompliance with this requirement was too high for them to be able
to detect an overall effect.

CONCLUSION
This chapter has discussed the role of workers’ compensation
programs in preventing occupational injuries and illnesses. As we
explained, factors that make workers’ compensation better or easier
for workers have the potential to decrease workers’ safety incentives.
Factors that increase the cost of workers’ compensation increase
experience-rated firms’ safety incentives.
Experience rating, as well as any other strategy to make workers’
compensation premiums reflect employers’ past claims histories, also
has the potential to improve safety and bring it closer to optimal levels. In addition to creating safety incentives, worker-friendly workers’
compensation policies and benefits also have reporting incentives.
This complicates empirical research on the role of workers’ compensation in encouraging injury prevention.
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Although much of the research is conflicting in its findings or
cannot adequately deal with all of the empirical challenges, we consider the following conclusions to be warranted. First, having firms’
workers’ compensation premiums reflect previous claiming history
appears to improve safety. Having workers’ compensation premiums reflect prior losses can be achieved through experience rating or
through encouraging price competition in the workers’ compensation
insurance market, both of which align premiums with claims experience. Also, high-deductible workers’ compensation policies can give
even smaller employers the same incentives for prevention as experience rating.
While making premiums more closely match claims history
increases firms’ attention to safety, it also increases firms’ incentives
to discourage workers from claiming workers’ compensation benefits
and to encourage workers to return to work before they are ready.
As workers likely already underreport work-related injuries, workers’
compensation programs must make sure that incentives to improve
firm safety do not result in workers being left out of the workers’
compensation safety net.
Another shortcoming of experience rating is that it does little to
prevent occupational disease injuries, which develop over long periods of time. As workers have shorter tenures with firms now than they
had in the past, firms can expect that other firms will have to deal with
the increased workers’ compensation costs from such occupational
injuries, which reduces their incentives for prevention.
Although much evidence documents a positive relationship
between injuries and workers’ compensation benefits, we think the
evidence is inconclusive that workers’ compensation benefits encourage workers to act more recklessly, despite the theoretical basis.
Even given the vast improvements in the empirical sophistication of research methods and in precautions taken for workers over
the years, separating out the reporting effects and safety effects for
workers and firms remains a major challenge. Similarly, better data
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on injuries is vital in determining whether workplace safety is driving
down injuries or whether workers are just reporting fewer injuries.
Finally, we conclude that more direct and innovative research is
needed on the impact of safety programs and on workers’ compensation incentives to encourage firms to implement them. However, it is
clear that even the best-designed safety programs will require compliance for them to succeed.
Notes
1. For ease of exposition, we use the term injuries throughout the chapter
to refer to any compensable claim, including occupational diseases.
2. Broad empirical support is found in economic research that shows
workers are paid a wage premium for working in riskier jobs. Refer to
Viscusi and Aldy (2003) for a thorough review of this literature.
3. While McInerney and Simon (2012) find no evidence that making workers’ compensation more difficult to obtain increases take-up of federal
disability insurance, Dillender (2015) and Heaton (2012) both find evidence that workers’ having health insurance results in less medical care
being paid for by workers’ compensation. Dillender (2016) discusses
the potential influence of the Affordable Care Act’s expansion of health
insurance on workers’ compensation insurance.
4. See Reville, Bhattacharya, and Weinstein (2001) for a review of possible sources.
5. It should also be noted that occupational deaths and diseases have
benefit-adequacy concerns, as many surviving spouses entitled to benefits do not receive the benefits due them.
6. Retrospective rating is another type of insurance policy that has incentives similar to experience rating. With retrospective rating, firms’ premiums depend on their claims during the policy period. Retrospectiverated firms pay their premiums at the start of the policy period. Firms
with high losses will have to pay additional premiums, while firms with
low losses will receive refunds on their premiums. Retrospective rating
is less common than experience rating, and we are unaware of research
into the safety effects of retrospective rating.
   7. If all small firms improved safety, WC claims and costs would fall, since
premiums for small firms are based on all similar firms’ previous claims
experience. In the absence of experience rating, however, one firm’s
actions cannot have a noticeable effect on its own premiums.
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8. Comparisons of hard-to-diagnose injuries and easy-to-diagnose injuries
originate from a set of papers that study increased claiming on Mondays
as a way to test whether workers’ compensation benefits induce people
to claim that non-work-related injuries are work related. Smith (1990)
pioneered this research by showing in workers’ compensation claims
data that harder-to-diagnose injuries such as strains and sprains are more
likely to be reported on Mondays than easier-to-diagnose injuries like
cuts and fractures. Smith interprets his findings as evidence that workers
purposefully misreport some non-work-related injuries from the weekend as being work related. However, in their studies of the Monday
effect, Campolieti and Hyatt (2006) and Card and McCall (1996) find
evidence that is inconsistent with Smith’s interpretation.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

In this final chapter, we will review some of our findings from earlier

chapters, with a focus on what those findings tell us about workers’
compensation performance and policy issues. The previous chapters
focus on three of the most critical issues in workers’ compensation
policy: benefit adequacy, injury prevention, and return-to-work promotion. This concluding chapter provides our overview of the state
of workers’ compensation programs on these dimensions in the early
twenty-first century, after approximately 100 years of experience in
most states and provinces.

BENEFIT ADEQUACY
Our chapter on benefit adequacy departs in two ways from most
of the other empirical work on this subject. First, it includes studies
of workers’ compensation in Canada and our home state of Michigan that raise some methodological issues. Michigan does not have a
statutory designation of permanent partial disability (PPD) compensation as most other states do. As a wage-loss state, Michigan law
provides that lost earnings benefits shall be paid for the duration of
the disability, with a few exceptions. Furthermore, when claims are
closed in Michigan, there is no designation of the level of disability,
so there is no impairment rating available, but simply a record of the
payments made.1
Furthermore, the Michigan population of claimants receiving
lump-sum settlements includes those who file claims with disputed
coverage, questionable etiology, causation issues, level of disability
controversy, and many other matters without causative attribution.
Therefore, it is difficult to compare findings on the adequacy of workers’ compensation benefits in Michigan with states that designate ben-
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efits according to impairment ratings and states where PPD is specifically identified and accounted for.
The Canadian workers’ compensation systems are similar to
those in the United States, with two very significant differences. First,
there is generally no private insurance for work-related injuries in
Canadian provinces; all workers’ compensation insurance is with
public entities. Second, benefits are typically more generous, and
waiting periods are either shorter or nonexistent. By including studies
of these jurisdictions in our review of workers’ compensation benefit
adequacy, we hope to enlarge the discussion and expand the possibilities. This despite the fact that adding more system observations also
raises the bar for generalization and makes policy conclusions even
more challenging.
Second, our preference is to use the yardstick of “earnings
replacement” as opposed to “loss replacement” to measure benefit
adequacy. This means we count both workers’ compensation wageloss benefits paid and actual earnings after the injury as income and
offset these against the estimated wages that would have been earned
in the absence of injury. We think this is a more useful measure of
average benefit adequacy than loss replacement rates. Loss replacement rates consider postinjury earnings as reducing the losses suffered by the injured worker, but they also serve to narrow the focus
to just the performance of the workers’ compensation system rather
than the broader social goal of maintaining workers’ incomes during
disability.
Previous empirical work on workers’ compensation benefit adequacy has concluded that these benefits are far from meeting reasonable standards of adequacy—usually set at replacement of two-thirds
of lost wages after taxes. Furthermore, some studies indicate that the
performance seems to be worse for the more serious injury cases, as
indicated by duration of disability or impairment rating.
Despite the limitations to comparison imposed by major policy
and analytical differences, it appears that the Michigan workers’ compensation system provides more adequate benefits than many other
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state systems. This appears to be largely due to the wage-loss orientation and the “spendable earnings” wage replacement formula used in
Michigan. Taking account of income, payroll taxes, and family size
clearly provides the opportunity for tailoring wage-loss replacement
more closely to apparent need across all workers. So, despite a lower
maximum benefit in Michigan set at 90 percent of the state average
weekly wage, versus 100 percent in most U.S. states, workers’ compensation wage-loss benefits in Michigan look pretty good.
If the Michigan benefits appear to be better than in some other
U.S. states, they are clearly not as adequate as in the Canadian systems
that have had similar wage-loss studies. Benefits in British Columbia
and Ontario are significantly more generous than in Michigan or in
other U.S. states. This is reflected in higher wage-replacement ratios,
higher maximum benefits, and shorter waiting periods (if any). It may
also reflect the fact that all the Canadian provinces have exclusivefund (monopolistic) public insurers for workers’ compensation.
Whether this results in more “generous” administration of the
systems as well is debatable, but the realized benefits are clearly
superior.
There remains the crucial issue of the adequacy of benefits for
permanent or long-term injuries. This has been the focus of most of
the earlier empirical work on the subject, and the results are not reassuring: The comparative study done by Reville et al. (2001) showed
a range of 29 to 46 percent for 10-year loss-replacement rates for
the five states included in the study. Tompa, Mustard, et al. (2010)
found aggregate loss-replacement rates of around 100 percent for
claims with more than 50 percent impairment ratings under both the
impairment standard in Ontario before 1990 and the loss-of-earningscapacity standard in Ontario after 1990. For the “bifurcated benefit”
system in British Columbia before 2002, the loss-replacement rate for
these claims was 126 percent.2
In Michigan’s wage-loss system, since there is no impairment
rating, we focus just on those claims that receive lump-sum settlements (called “redemptions” in Michigan). While it is no doubt cor-
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rect that most of these claims would receive permanent partial awards
in other U.S. states, there is no way to compensate for the additional
proportion of these claims that might be compromised over disputes
on coverage, etiology, or other issues. Inclusion of these claims would
presumably bias the Michigan measure of adequacy downward.
Yet the lump-sum settlement claims in Michigan showed a 92
percent loss-replacement rate and a 95 percent earnings-replacement
rate for the observed average of 4.5 years after the injury. When this
is extrapolated to 10 years, including the claim reserves held by the
insurer, the earnings replacement rate falls to 67 percent, still a decent
performance. Results are slightly better for claims with wage-loss
benefit duration over 52 weeks but no lump-sum settlement. Again,
benefit adequacy appears to be better in Michigan than in the other
U.S. states where benefit adequacy has been studied.
The last issue raised by the benefit adequacy chapter is that of
leaving the labor force as a result of a compensable injury. Injured
workers who file workers’ compensation claims appear to experience
a permanent drop in labor force participation similar to that which
occurs when the employer goes out of business completely. While
the reasons for this drop in labor force participation are unclear, it
further complicates the analysis of benefit adequacy. It raises the issue
of whether withdrawal from the labor force was caused by the compensable injury itself, the settlement of the claim, or perhaps by other
influences. However, it is still troubling to think that so many injured
workers are not able to resume their work lives after a compensable
injury.

PREVENTION INCENTIVES
As economists, we begin with the assumption that both workers
and employers (with their insurer representatives) make choices about
providing safety and about their response to injury. Employers provide the workplace and explicitly select the level of safety designed
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into that workplace. They also adopt human resource policies that
may encourage or discourage safe behaviors. Workers may accept the
safety environment of the firm, but they still make choices about how
careful they will be in preventing an injury and how they will respond
to incentives provided after an injury.3
What makes this interesting is that the financial incentives for
workers and employers contradict each other. Employers seek to
minimize costs for a given level of production. This would include
compensating wage differentials for the risk of injury, the costs of
producing a safer environment, and the costs of workers’ compensation insurance. Workers face the loss of income during a period
of disability plus the obvious pain, suffering, and inconvenience that
may accompany the injury itself. But better workers’ compensation
benefits (i.e., higher earnings-replacement rates) reduce the incentive
for workers to avoid injury.
Although much empirical evidence points to a positive relationship between frequency of injuries and workers’ compensation benefits, we feel the evidence is inconclusive that better workers’ compensation benefits actually encourage workers to act more recklessly,
despite the theoretical basis and despite the fact that claim rates are
often higher after benefits increase. This is because there is also a
reporting effect observed when compensation is improved. If the
incentive to report the injury is increased by more generous benefits,
a larger proportion of injuries will be reported, and a higher incidence
of claims will be observed. Separating reporting effects from safety
effects among injured workers remains a major empirical challenge.
However, making workers’ compensation premiums more accurately reflect the previous claims history of individual employers
appears to improve employers’ safety and prevention efforts, as well
as to encourage employers to devote more attention to the worker’s
successful return to work. Methods to make premium levels more
closely match claims history include experience-rated premiums,
encouraging more competition in the workers’ compensation insurance market, and offering high-deductible plans to employers. All of
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these devices should help to make the employers’ cost of workers’
compensation insurance more closely reflect the actual cost of injuries, thereby bringing financial incentives into alignment with policy
objectives.
Despite the promise of having insurance premiums more closely
match actual claim costs, thus providing improved signaling about
prevention behavior, policymakers need to be aware of two concerns.
First, claim costs that influence premiums also provide firms with
incentives to discourage workers from claiming workers’ compensation benefits at all, and such behaviors likely encourage workers to
return to work before they are ready. In both cases, claim costs and
future premiums will be lower even though it is not clear that the
policy objective has been met.
Second, having claim costs influence employer insurance premiums does little to prevent occupational diseases or other injuries
that develop over long periods of time. Even self-insured employers
who pay all workers’ compensation costs directly still have too many
such disability claims. Thus, while market-signal incentives could be
improved, it does not seem possible to replace direct regulation of
safety and health matters with market incentives through the workers’ compensation program. We will continue to need public health
standards and direct enforcement mechanisms to protect the health of
workers and others.

RETURN TO WORK
While preventing work-related disability should be our ultimate
aim, and ensuring adequate compensation our intermediate policy
goal, returning the injured worker to his or her place of employment
is the immediate practical challenge. We will never be able to prevent
all injuries and diseases, and maintaining adequate benefits is a political struggle with ebbs and flows, but there should be no dispute about
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return to work as the goal for all stakeholders in workers’ compensation programs.
The “win-win” aspect of return to work is highly motivating, as
workers’ incomes will be higher and employers’ costs will be lower
if injured workers can be put back to work more swiftly and safely.
But this takes a continuous, concentrated, and coordinated effort to
achieve.4 The term disability management has come to represent
a workplace-focused approach that includes a set of techniques
designed to improve return-to-work performance. These techniques
began to be applied in the 1980s as workers’ compensation costs
increased at unprecedented rates. Leading employers perceived that
the “soft glove” was more productive than the “hard fist” when it came
to coping with work-related disability. Maintaining contact with the
injured worker, improving medical management, and accommodating limitations at work, including job modification, schedule changes,
and alternative work assignments, were demonstrated to reduce the
incidence and duration of work-related disability.
Furthermore, the disability-management approach aligns naturally with employee retention by the original at-injury employer,
which produces vastly superior return-to-work results for the injured
worker while it also demonstrates the employer’s commitment to the
workforce. As well, it may also reduce the cost of disability when
viewed from a social perspective (Ben-Shalom 2015). So what has
been the impact of disability management techniques on workers’
compensation outcomes? Unfortunately, we have to be satisfied with
indirect evidence of these impacts. The number of reported occupational injuries and illnesses with any days away from work declined
by 66 percent from 1993 to 2013 (BLS 2016). In most U.S. states,
three to seven days away from work are required to qualify for wageloss benefits, so the number of workers’ compensation wage-loss
claims has obviously declined rapidly as well. The National Council
on Compensation Insurance (NCCI) reports a 58 percent decline in
such claims between 1993 and 2010 (Sengupta, Baldwin, and Reno
2014). Interestingly, the average duration for workers’ compensation
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wage-loss claims has actually risen over the past two decades. We
conjecture that disability-management techniques are more effective at targeting small workers’ compensation claims for relatively
minor injuries than they are at shortening claims arising from serious
or catastrophic injuries. This would explain the increase in duration
of claims.
Additionally, the number of cases with restricted work, which
includes the effect of many disability management techniques, rose
from the mid-1980s through 2000 at the same time that the number of cases with days away from work was declining (Ruser and
Wiatrowski 2013). We believe this reflects the spread of disability
management techniques through the ranks of employers, insurers,
and providers and their subsequent impact on workers’ compensation
claims and return-to-work outcomes for injured workers.
Credible evidence on the impact of return-to-work programs is
sparse but promising. Impacts of up to 40 percent reduction in disability duration have been reported among large self-insured firms
(McLaren, Reville, and Seabury 2010). Several review articles have
found strong empirical support for the effects of disability management techniques. We conclude that properly motivated disability
management techniques can remove many barriers to return-to-work
for workers with impairments, which reduces both workers’ compensation costs for employers and lost wages for workers. Disability
management holds considerable promise for improving this critical
performance dimension of workers’ compensation systems. This is
reflected in the plethora of state policy innovations that directly or
indirectly support or encourage these interventions.
There remain some concerns about the potential for disability
management to descend into claims-discouraging activities, or “perverse disability management,” which has the goal of reducing claims
volume or severity to reduce workers’ compensation costs without
benefit to the injured worker. We believe that workers’ compensation claims suppression is real and is practiced by some employers
and their insurers for financial gain. However, we also believe that,
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overall, disability management has been a positive development in
workers’ compensation systems and has benefited both injured workers and their employers. We need better focus and more measurable
outcomes to ensure that these benefits are realized.
So, where do workers’ compensation programs stand after a century of experience? The ProPublica/NPR series of publications beginning in 2015 raised serious questions about the performance of our
state workers’ compensation systems.5 The title of the initial article,
“The Demolition of Workers’ Compensation” (Grabell and Berkes
2015), prompted widespread reaction, both pro and con.
According to the U.S. Department of Labor, “Recent years have
seen significant changes to the workers’ compensation laws, procedures and policies in numerous states, which have limited benefits,
reduced the likelihood of successful application for workers’ compensation, and/or discouraged injured workers from applying for benefits” (USDOL 2016, p. 2).
Furthermore, “Some state legislatures continue to attempt to
reduce workers’ compensation costs, and proposals for statutory
amendments that restrict workers’ benefits or access have become
increasingly bold” (USDOL 2016, p. 2). This has extended up to and
including the “opt out” legislation in Texas and Oklahoma and the
discussions in Tennessee and South Carolina. It remains to be seen
whether an effective replacement for traditional workers’ compensation programs will emerge from these experiments.
However, we find that for the three performance dimensions examined here, things are not quite so bleak in the workers’ compensation
world. First, there are design elements, such as the spendable earnings
approach within a strict wage-loss system, that seem to provide better
adequacy of workers’ compensation benefits than the medical-based
impairment-and-gross-earnings-replacement approach. Second, workers’ compensation and other market incentives do appear to improve
employer safety and prevention performance. They also seem to affect
the claiming behavior of injured workers. Third, disability manage-
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ment techniques can significantly reduce the burden of work-related
disability for both workers and employers in our workplaces.
We hope this modest volume will help policymakers to improve
the performance of these social insurance systems during their second
century. There are several ways forward, and they have been implemented in best practice among several state systems. What seems to
be lacking is the political resolve to change these century-old workers’ compensation systems to move toward better policy and practice
in the future.
Notes
1. There may also be an amount reserved for future medical benefits,
which must be reported to CMS at the federal level to facilitate coordination with possible Medicare or Medicaid benefits.
2. The bifurcated system provided that the higher of the impairment or the
loss-of-earning-capacity benefit should be paid.
   3. Of course, the level of safety provided by the firm may also be a factor
in their choice of employer.
   4. See Gifford and Parry (2016) for discussion.
5. For a list of this series of articles, see ProPublica (2017).
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